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 Between 2001 and 2008 the U.S. launched approximately 50 lethal strikes using 
unmanned aerial vehicles, (UAVs) in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.  In contrast, the 
Obama administration has launched over 417 strikes since taking office in 2009.  Some 
analysts have stated that the increase is the inevitable result of President Obama’s 
decision to eliminate extrajudicial detention.  They argue that the Obama administration 
painted itself into a corner of “no-quarters” warfare wherein enemy combatants outside of 
a declared war zone are no longer eligible for capture.  However, this view fails to 
recognize that the expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program was already gaining 
momentum prior to President Obama’s inauguration.  The rapid expansion of the U.S. 
targeted killing program after 2008 has been primarily contingent on three factors:  The 
development and availability of UAVs, the Executive’s evolving approach to terror 
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There are terrorists holed up in those mountains who murdered 3,000 Americans. They 
are plotting to strike again. It was a terrible mistake to fail to act when we had a chance to 
take out an al-Qaida leadership meeting in 2005.  If we have actionable intelligence about 






In the early morning hours of January 23, 2009 multiple hellfire missiles launched 
from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, (UAV)
2
 slammed into two remote villages of 
Pakistan’s Waziristan provinces killing approximately four suspected militants and as 
many as eleven civilians.
3
  Less than 24-hours earlier, a freshly-minted President Obama 
had signed two executive orders effectively ending the practice of extrajudicial detention 
at Guantanamo Bay naval base and CIA black sites.
4
  Now, with the focus of the 
international community on him President Obama convened his first National Security 
Council meeting on Pakistan and Afghanistan to craft the administration’s strategy in the 
region.  Although he had previously hinted at a willingness to take decisive action against 
                                                          
1




 The term “Unmanned Aerial Vehicle” or UAV is the official military classification for group of vehicles 
collectively known as “Drones.”  The United Nations places UAVs within a larger category including 
ground platforms known as “Lethal Autonomous Robotics,” or LARS.   
 
3
 Smith, J. & Rondeaux, C. (2009, January 24). 2 U.S. Airstrikes Offer a Concrete Sign of Obama's 




 (2009, January 22). Executive Order -- Review And Disposition Of Individuals Detained At The 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base And Closure Of Detention Facilities.  Retrieved at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/closure-guantanamo-detention-facilities   (2009, January 22). 





terrorists in the region,
5
  few of Obama’s supporters would have guessed what came next.  
Rather than curtail and limit the circumstances under which UAVs could be used to kill 
suspected terrorists, Obama doubled-down on the tactic.  From 2009 to 2014, the Obama 
administration would oversee approximately 417 lethal strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia representing a 600% increase in their usage from 2001 to 2008.  The magnitude 
of the increase in such strikes has sent journalists and academics alike scrambling for 
superlatives to describe it, while igniting a fierce debate on the legality, morality, and 
efficacy of targeted killing as a state policy.   
This policy has shocked many in the public, but some analysts have stated that it 
is the inevitable result of President Obama’s executive order to close Guantanamo, all 
CIA black sites, and to severely constrain extraordinary rendition.   In his 2012 book Kill 
or Capture, author Daniel Klaidman makes a startling assertion when he writes “the 
inability to detain terror suspects was creating perverse incentives that favored killing or 
releasing suspected terrorists over capturing them.”
6
  The argument is that the Obama 
administration painted itself into a corner of “no-quarters” warfare wherein enemy 
combatants outside of a declared war zone are simply no longer eligible for capture.
 7   
Journalists, authors, and academics have adopted this theory when attempting to explain 
                                                          
5
 See intro quote.  
 
6
 Klaidman, D. (2012). Kill or capture: The war on terror and the soul of the Obama presidency. Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
 
7
 Klaidman claims that the best example of this new lethal policy can be found in the September 14, 2009 
targeting of Somali AQ leader Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhani.  The president, after being briefed on an 
opportunity to target Nabhani ordered that he should be killed by a manned U.S. strike team.
 
 His generals 
informed him that such a mission could potentially violate U.S. adherence to international humanitarian 
law or the laws of land warfare which dictate that after an enemy combatant has been rendered defenseless, 
he or she is considered a prisoner of war and must be rendered first aid and accorded food, shelter, and 
protection.
 
 The general’s concerns were noted, and the raid went ahead as directed killing Nabhani and 
several other members of the Al Shabab network.  (Klaidman p. 126) 
3 
 
the unprecedented expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program after 2008; but is it 
correct? 
The Obama administration’s rationale for the increased use of targeted killing is 
simple.  First and foremost it is effective.  In his 2012 speech on drone policy, John 
Brennan highlights a number of high-profile strikes and alludes to documents seized 
during the 2011 Bin Laden raid that reflect Al-Qaeda’s increasingly desperate leadership 
vacuum.
8
 Next, Brennan argues that precision drone strikes minimize the risk of civilian 
casualties making it morally more agreeable than the alternative of conventional bombs 
or ground invasion, and finally that they allow the United States to seek out its disparate 
enemies in parts of the world where its soldiers, and the soldiers of the host country, are 
unable or unwilling to reach.  In defending the legality of the practice President Obama 
put it succinctly in his watershed speech on drones in May, 2013: “…America’s actions 
are legal.  We were attacked on 9/11.  Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly 
authorized the use of force.  Under domestic law, and international law, the United States 
                                                          
8
 “Remotely piloted aircraft in particular can be a wise choice because of geography, with their ability to fly 
hundreds of miles over the most treacherous terrain, strike their targets with astonishing precision, and then 
return to base.  They can be a wise choice because of time, when windows of opportunity can close quickly 
and there may be just minutes to act.  They can be a wise choice because they dramatically reduce the 
danger to U.S. personnel, even eliminating the danger altogether.  Yet they are also a wise choice because 
they dramatically reduce the danger technology and with the safety of distance—might actually have a 
clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, including the presence of innocent civilians.  It’s this 
surgical precision—the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida 
terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it—that makes this counterterrorism tool so essential.  
There’s another reason that targeted strikes can be a wise choice—the strategic consequences that 
inevitably come with the use of force.  As we’ve seen, deploying large armies abroad won’t always be our 
best offense.  Countries typically don’t want foreign soldiers in their cities and towns.  In fact, large, 
intrusive military deployments risk playing into al-Qa’ida’s strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly 
wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and inspire the next generation of 
terrorists.  In comparison, there is the precision of targeted strikes.” Brennan, J. Assistant to the President 
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (2012, April 30) As Prepared for Delivery, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars 
4 
 
is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.”
9
  The Obama 
administration clearly believes that its use of targeted killing is legal, moral, and most 
importantly a very effective tool against Al-Qaeda and its associates.  
 However, the current administration’s enthusiasm for the practice does not on its 
own explain why the number of strikes has increased so dramatically in the last five 
years. Former Bush administration officials have made remarks that they support the 
practice of targeted killing, implying that they would not approach the problem 
differently.
10
  In fact the record suggests that the Bush administration was already 
embracing the tactic during its last year in office.  After authorizing only 18 instances of 
targeted killing outside of Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2007, President Bush 
oversaw 37 such strikes in 2008 alone.
11
   The forces driving the expansion of the U.S. 
targeted killing program were already gaining momentum prior to President Obama’s 
inauguration.   
Providing a deeper understanding of these forces is the aim of this thesis.  It will 
argue that the rapid expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program after 2008 has been 
primarily contingent on three factors:   
(1) The development and availability of UAVs.   
(2) The legal status of the targeted individual(s) 
(3) The context of each strike decision 
                                                          
9








 New America Foundation, Analysis: Pakistan Drone Strikes – Obama v. Bush, last updated June 8, 2013, 




Understanding the interaction of these three factors will give the reader a holistic view of 
how the U.S. targeted killing program has evolved to become what Kevin Heller aptly 
describes as “one hell of a killing machine.”
12
 
The remainder of chapter one includes a rundown of competing theories on the 
subject.  Chapter two quickly frames the larger debate on the legality, morality, and 
efficacy of targeted killing.  Chapter three enters into the heart of the thesis with a 
discussion on the evolution of UAVs as the preferred targeted killing platform, and the 
logistical challenges presented by actually getting them to the target.  Chapter four 
examines the impact of the executive branches’ legal approach to terror suspects on the 
decision to kill or capture. Chapter five uses context as a tool to understand why the 
number of strikes vacillated significantly on a month-to-month basis in Yemen and 
Somalia.  Chapter six goes from macro to micro by examining three case studies.  
Finally, chapter seven concludes with a discussion about where the U.S. may next 
employ UAVs in a lethal role, as well as the potential impact of U.S. actions on the 
development of international norms.  
 
What Have Others Said?  
 
If an increase in the level of support for the policy of targeted killing from one 
presidential administration to the next is not sufficient to explain the U.S. expansion of its 
targeted killing program, what do other researchers and journalists have to say?  
 
                                                          
12
 Heller, K. J. (February 15, 2013). 'One Hell of a Killing Machine': Signature Strikes and International 
Law. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 11, 1, 89-119. 
6 
 
Klaidman et al.  Lack of Legal Detention Options Increases Targeted Killing  
 
Blum and Heymann make a similar observation to Klaidman in their 2010 book 
Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists when they state, “The more complicated detention has 
become, the more attractive targeted killing seems to be,”
13
 and in 2013 noted drone 
journalist Craig Whitlock wrote  
The administration and Congress have not reached agreement on a consistent 
legal pathway for apprehending terrorism suspects overseas and bringing them to 
justice.  The impasse and lack of detention options, critics say, have led to a de 
facto policy under which the administration finds it easier to kill terrorism 





Jointly these statements paint a picture of a president handcuffed by the law, and forced 
to choose between either killing dangerous individuals, or simply allowing them to 
continue operating with impunity.   
The notion that the U.S. is operating under such a condition is potentially 
explosive as it directly challenges the president’s stated policy that “America does not 
take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference is 
always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute.”
15
 On the surface the numbers seem to 
support Klaidman’s argument.  The Bush administration detained 779 enemy fighters at 
its extrajudicial facility in Guantanamo, and another 136 through extraordinary rendition 
                                                          
13
 Gabriella Blum & Phillip Heymann:  Laws, Outlaws, and Terrorists, Lessons from the War on 
Terrorism, MIT Press, MA, 2010.  
 
14
 Whitlock, C. (2013, January 1). Renditions continue under Obama, despite due-process concerns, 





 Obama, B. (2013, May 23).  Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.  White House 






 while claiming responsibility for approximately 50 UAV strikes 
in Pakistan and Yemen from 2002-2008.  Strikes under the Bush administration are 
estimated to have killed approximately 470 militants and civilians.
17
  In contrast, the 
Obama administration ended detention at Guantanamo and other CIA-run sites, and has 
captured only 10 foreign terrorists.
18
   As the number of detentions dropped under 
Obama, the administration launched 417 UAV strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, 
which have killed between 2,400 and 3,000 militants and civilians.
 19
   
Klaidman’s argument does have its flaws.  It fails to explain why the Bush 
administration increased its use of targeted killing in 2008 prior to the closure of 
Guantanamo, and is not particularly helpful when applied at the individual level.  
However, the argument continues to surface as an explanation when people attempt to 
explain the expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program.  Therefore, Klaidman will 
serve as the primary foil for the arguments laid forth in this thesis.  
Strikes Protect the Right Flank and Are  More Popular than Detention / Invasion  
 
 Another potential argument is that Obama’s expansion of the targeted killing is 
attributable to the executive’s historic need to appear tough on threats to national 
security.  The imperative for democratic presidents to protect the so-called “right flank” 
                                                          
16
 Amrit Singh, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, Open Society 
Foundations, p. 8, NY, 2013.  
 
17
 New America Foundation, Analysis: Pakistan Drone Strikes – Obama v. Bush, last updated June 8, 2013, 
viewable at http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis 
 
18
 Singh, A. (2013).  Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, Open 
Society Foundations, p. 21, NY.  
 
19
 “The number of estimated deaths from the Obama administration’s drone strikes is more than four times 
what is was during the bush administration.” Bergen, P. (2012, September 19).  Drone is Obama’s Weapon 
of Choice.  Retrieved at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone/  
8 
 
is often cited as a driving force behind tough foreign policy moves that bolster an image 
of presidential resolve.
20
 Klaidman’s book recounts an interchange between counter-
terror advisor Richard Clarke and then-senator Obama:   
Clarke stated a simple fact. ‘As president you kill people.’  He wasn’t just talking 
about sending troops into battle – in shadow wars, presidents know the names and 
addresses of people they have killed.  Obama stared back at Clarke for several 
seconds. ‘I know that,’ he said quietly. ‘He didn’t flinch,’ Clarke later recalled.
21
   
 
Following the Bin Laden raid, Obama’s approval rating rose twelve points with 
Republicans, nine points with independents, and no points with democrats, resulting in an 
aggregate gain of six points overall.
22
  However, Obama has continued his use of targeted 
killing well-after tea-party Republicans forged an unlikely alliance with groups like to 




Richard Neustadt’s theory that presidential popularity translates into presidential 
power suggests that both Bush and Obama would go with the policy that is most popular 
in order to horde political capital for their top priorities.
24
  If one were to believe an 
argument that targeted killings are more popular than long-term extrajudicial detention or 
a conventional force occupation, this argument has some explanatory power.  In 2012 
Jack Goldsmith predicted that the controversy over the use of drones would force the 
                                                          
20




 Klaidman p. 58 
 
22
 Jones, J. (2011, May 5). Obama Approval Rallies Six Points to 52% After Bin Laden Death, Gallup. 
Retrieved at http://www.gallup.com/poll/147437/obama-approval-rallies-six-points-bin-laden-death.aspx  
 
23




 Neustadt, R. E. (1960). Presidential power, the politics of leadership. New York: Wiley. 
9 
 
presidency to curtail the program in the face of internal bureaucratic resistance, and 
pressure from external forces such as the press, social media, and civil rights groups.  
This prediction seemed to be coming true with President Obama’s May 23, 2013 speech 
on the curtailment of the drone program and the subsequent decline in the number of 
strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
 25
 
However, while the argument is appealing it may not be so straightforward.  For 
example, while polls at the end of the Bush administration showed little support for the 
occupation of Iraq,
26
 support for Guantanamo remained high.
27
  Despite this, the Bush 
administration sharply curtailed its use of extrajudicial detention, adding only one 
additional detainee in 2008 while at the same time rapidly expanding its use of lethal 
strikes.
28
  In addition, polling evidence taken as recently as 2013 suggests that Americans 
are equally accepting of both targeted killing and extrajudicial detention.  In separate 
polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, 56% supported the use of drones to kill 
                                                          
25
 Goldsmith takes a position that is runs counter to much of the accepted thought on the seemingly 
inexorable expansion of presidential war powers.  The majority of scholars on the subject have argued that 
presidential powers have expanded with each major U.S. conflict and although they contract afterward, 
vestiges of that expanded power remain and create a net increase in the power of the executive branch.  
Proponents of this theory have been particularly alarmed by the U.S. "War on Terrorism" as it represents a 
major conflict seemingly without end and would therefore justify a permanent expansion of presidential 
war powers. Goldsmith is less concerned about this as he argues that the executive is in many ways more 
constrained today than it was prior to the attacks of 9/11.  Goldsmith argues that the modern executive is 
constrained by traditional constitutional checks and balances, by internal bureaucratic resistance, and by 
external forces such as the press, social media, and civil rights groups.  Perhaps the most interesting part of 
his argument is his discussion of the bureaucratic resistance of military commanders and military lawyers 
conditioned not to violate international norms of the laws of land warfare and the treatment of enemy 
detainees/POWs.  Goldsmith argues that in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the resultant blowback 
from incidents such as My Lai, the military inculcated a culture of accountability to the laws of war into 
every aspect of its operation.  Goldsmith, J. L. (2012). Power and constraint: The accountable presidency 
after 9/11. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.   
 
26












terrorist suspects and 70% responded favorably to the idea of keeping terror suspects in 
Guantanamo indefinitely.
29
  Therefore, any argument that presidential policy on the 
matter of targeted killing is wholly driven by its popularity with the American public is 
likely flawed.  
Of the two competing theories presented here, Klaidman’s has the most 
substantive support and bears additional scrutiny.   In the next chapter we will examine 
the larger debate on the legality, morality, and efficacy of targeted killing before moving 
into the heart of the argument put forth in this thesis.  
  
                                                          
29
 (2013, February 11).  Continued Support for U.S. Drone Strikes, Pew Research Center.  Retrieved at 
http://www.people-press.org/2013/02/11/continued-support-for-u-s-drone-strikes/  
 
Tyson, A. (2013, May 29).  Should Guantanamo be open or closed? Either way, Democrats have stuck with 





CAN LETHAL TARGETING BE JUSTIFIED? 
 
 To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in 
every instance.  For the same human progress that gives us the technology to strike half a 




Before we go deeper into answering why the U.S. has expanded its targeted 
killing program, it is important to acknowledge a much larger debate over whether the 
U.S. should be doing so in the first place.  The issue of whether the U.S. should engage in 
the practice of targeted killing revolves around three main questions:  First, is it legal, 
second is it moral, and third is it effective?  Hitting the high points of this debate will 
help to frame the overall issue, and provide context for the reader.  It would be difficult to 
understand the reasons behind the expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program without 
first understanding the opposing views on these questions.  
Is It Legal? 
 
In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice responded to a request by the administration 
for a defined legal argument supporting its decision to target U.S. citizen Anwar Alwaki. 
In its response, the DOJ laid out the legal foundation for the U.S. policy of targeted 
killing: 
The President has authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by al-Qa’ida and 
its associated forces, arising from his constitutional responsibility to protect the 
country, the inherent right of the United States to national self-defense under 
international law, Congress’s authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate 
                                                          
30
 Obama, B. (2013, May 23).  Remarks by the President at the National Defense University,  White House 




military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-




This statement makes it clear that the U.S. rests its defense of lethal targeting on three 
main pillars:  First, that the U.S. is in a state of war with Al-Qaeda and its associated 
forces, next owing to that state of war, the U.S. has an inherent right to self-defense 
recognized in article 51 of the U.N. Charter,
32
 and finally that Congress has given its 
approval for lethal targeting under the provisions of the Authorization for the Use of 
Military Force that passed in the days following the attacks of September 11, 2001.
33
  
Given this set of circumstances, the U.S. argues that the only restrictions governing the 
use of lethal force against terrorists are those laid out in International Humanitarian Law, 
(IHL) more commonly known as the “laws of war.”  With a basis in the amalgamated 
tradition of “Just War Theory,” specifically Jus in Bello,
34
 IHL places a number of 
                                                          
31
 Department of Justice, (2011, November 6).  White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’aida or an Associated Force.  
 
32
 “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” Article 51, Charter of the United Nations 
 
33
  “IN GENERAL- That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.” Joint Resolution U.S. Congress (2001, September 14).  Authorization for Use of 
Military Force against Terrorists. 
 
34
 Just War Theory is broken into three parts:  Jus ad Bellum refers to the decision about whether to start a 
war, while Jus in Bello refers to how the war is fought once it begins, (targeting etc.).  Finally, Jus post 
Bellum, is a framework for how to prosecute the peace in most interpretations.  Just War Theory has its 
roots in medieval religious philosophy when it entrenched the notion that legal justification is required for 
the legitimate use of force.  Whereas natural law suggests that war is just only in self-defense, this notion 
was gradually expanded by proponents of international law who argued that war could be justified to 
prevent the development of future threats and punish past attacks.  The theory served as the basis for the 
development of Hague conventions, the League of Nations, and ultimately the U.N. charter.  However, 
Article 51 of the U.N. charter is considerably more restrictive than the medieval notion.  The modern 
doctrine of self-defense does not permit the use of force to prevent the development of potential future 
threats, or to punish past attacks.  The Article does allow for self-defense in the event of imminent armed 
attack known as “anticipatory self-defense.”  Differing state notions of what constitutes an “imminent 
armed attack” creates maneuvering room for states that seek to exercise a broader interpretation of it (i.e. 
13 
 
restrictions on the conduct of states engaging in armed combat which can be synthesized 
into six general tenants:  (1) Obey all international laws on weapons probation, (i.e. no 
chemical weapons) (2) Discrimination and non-combatant immunity, (don’t kill civilians) 
(3) Proportionality, (don’t drop a 2,000 lb. bomb in a neighborhood to kill a sniper) (4) 
Benevolent quarantine of prisoners of war, (if the enemy surrenders you must take him 
prisoner and treat him humanely) (5) No means Mala in Se (Soldiers may not use 
weapons or methods that are inherently evil), (6) No reprisals (if someone breaks the 
rules, it doesn’t mean you can too).
35
 The U.S. states that it adheres strictly to the laws of 
war, and is therefore justified in its prosecution of the war against Al-Qaeda and 
associated forces.    
   Although the U.S. claims to stand on firm legal footing with its use of lethal 
targeting, there are dissenting voices who say that the U.S. is not really at war with Al-
Qaeda.   Proponents of the law enforcement mode of combating terrorism argue that 
nation states do not go to war with non-state actors, and therefore the state’s pursuit of a 
terrorist organization should not be considered within state of war framework.  They 
emphasize that there is no provision within article 51 of the U.N. charter that allows one 
nation state to attack non-state actors within the borders of another state without it being 
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war. Peterborough, Ont: Broadview Press. Finkelstein, C. O., Ohlin, J. D., & Altman, A. (2012). Targeted 
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viewed as an attack on the host-nation itself. 
36
  Thus, any action against non-state actors 
(who cannot be considered enemy combatants) must be coordinated through the host-
nation government, with an emphasis on capture and prosecution.  Proponents of the law 
enforcement approach point to the Geneva Convention position on non-combatants which 
states “the lawfulness of deprivation of life for punitive (or pre-emptive) purposes is 
inconceivable without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized 
peoples”
37
 as evidence that a state cannot kill an individual without some form of 
qualified judicial review.   
 According to law enforcement proponents the only time that the use of extra-
judicial lethal force is authorized under the rule of law paradigm is when the risk to other 
lives is at its most imminent.  In order to be lawful under the normative paradigm of law 
enforcement, a particular targeted killing must, cumulatively:  (1) Have sufficient legal 
basis in domestic law, which regulates the use of lethal force in accordance with the 
international normative paradigm of law enforcement. (2) Not be punitive but exclusively 
preventative in nature. (3) Aim exclusively at protecting human life from unlawful attack.  
(4) Be absolutely necessary in qualitative, quantitative, and temporal terms for the 
achievement of this purpose. (5) Be the undesired ultima ratio, and not the actual aim, of 
an operation which is planned, prepared and conducted so as to minimize to the greatest 
extent possible the recourse of lethal force.
38
 For example, an armed gunman in a 
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confrontation with police who have complete control of the perimeter is not subject to 
targeted killing unless he is physically in the mode of pointing his weapon at an officer or 
another civilian (i.e a hostage situation).  From this point of view the state use of lethal 
targeting against terrorists who have in the past carried out attacks or are engaged only in 
the planning an attack is illegal. 
 While the debate about the legality of lethal targeting continues within academic 
and legal circles, so long as the U.S. does not grossly violate the tenants of IHL, it seems 
unlikely that it will face any form of international condemnation for its actions.
3940
  
Therefore, we must conclude that in its current form the U.S. lethal targeting program is 
legal and move on.  
Is It Moral? 
 
While legal scholars continue the debate over whether targeted killing of non-
state actors is permissible under international law, moralists have begun to argue that 
limited actions like targeted killing actually represent a new category of just war theory 
known as jus ad vim (the just use of force).  Just war theorist Michael Walzer states that 
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jus ad vim defined as actions involving the limited use of force short of war, is 
characterized by “a diminished risk to one’s own troops, a destructive outcome that is 
more predictable and smaller in scale, a lower risk of civilian casualties, and a lower 
economic and military burden.”
41
  The Obama administration clearly believes that it is 
operating under this paradigm when John Brennan argues that  
They (UAVs) can be a wise choice because they dramatically reduce the danger 
to U.S. personnel, even eliminating the danger altogether.  They are also a wise 
choice because they dramatically reduce the danger and with the safety of 
distance--might actually have a clearer picture of the target and its surroundings, 
including the presence of innocent civilians.
42
   
 
However, under Walzer’s framework, this limited application of force must be evaluated 
under the same umbrella of moral justification as full-scale war.
43
  This would mean that 
the U.S. could be morally justified in its use of targeted killing only as a means of last 
resort.  In their 2013 article Daniel Brunstetter, and Megan Braun challenge this notion 
by arguing that jus ad vim is morally distinctive, and not merely a set of actions which 
ultimately lead to war.  Rather it represents “an alternative set of options to the large 
quantum force associated with war.”
44
 They argue that the moral bar within jus ad bellum 
to use force only as a method of last resort is lowered under jus ad vim to allow force 
when an imminent threat exists, and conditions preclude the option of policing measures.  
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In addition, some argue that it is morally preferable to employ targeted killing rather than 
to physically invade a country in order to root out terrorists.  They note that the former 
option inevitably leads to widespread human misery and the deaths of many who are 
minimally (if at all) involved in terrorism.
45
 In this view, the administration’s use of 
targeted killing as a limited response to terrorism is morally acceptable.   
Brunstetter and Braun do however note a number of reasons why this view is 
problematic.  First, they point out the argument that the reliance on technology to 
decrease the risk to U.S. soldiers often transfers the risk to noncombatants.
 46
  This is 
certainly applicable in the case of UAV strikes where U.S. personnel face no risk, while 
risking civilian lives in every event.  In addition they point out the realistic possibility 
that the “technology that permits jus ad vim actions, if not governed appropriately, 
empowers strong states to use force in ways to further their own security and interests, 
while placing weak states at their sufferance.”
47
 In this view, the ability to carry out 
operations under jus ad vim conditions serves only to further the interests of strong states 
and is ultimately destabilizing to notions of international order.  Finally, the authors note 
the danger that states may be tempted to discard any pretense of using targeted killing as 
a means of last resort, instead utilizing it as the default tactic and “Thus the use of jus ad 
vim as a means to enhance a state’s capacity to act on just cause proportionately and 
discriminately may lead to its propensity to do the opposite.”
48
 They point out that the 
U.S. employment of signature strikes against individuals and groups based on a 
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suspicious pattern of behavior is an example of such an expansion, and is the most 
morally problematic feature of the U.S. targeted killing program.    
It seems therefore that the U.S. use of targeted killing can be found morally 
permissible, particularly when viewed as an alternative to full-scale invasion.  However, 
the recent turn to signature strikes is less acceptable as any claims as to the intent of the 
targeted individual would be dubious at best.  
 
Is It Effective? 
 
Noted realism theorist Kenneth Waltz would argue that questions of legality and 
morality have little importance when compared to the question of efficacy.  In a world 
characterized by anarchy, realists argue that states must evaluate policy decisions on their 
relative ability to increase the state’s security.
49
  The question of whether the policy of 
lethal targeting increases or decreases or has no effect on state security is the most hotly 
debated of the three questions on the issue.  As with most questions of this nature, the 
answer is complicated and may depend on who is being targeted.  Much of the debate 
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centers on the lethal targeting of High Value Individuals, (HVIs) who represent the senior 
leadership of terrorist organizations.  Some have argued convincingly that the mortality 
rate of terrorist organizations increases significantly when the leadership is killed within 
the first two years of a terrorist group’s formation; 
50
 while others contend that so-called 
“decapitation strikes” are counterproductive
51
 and actually increase the intensity of 
terrorist activity.
52
   
As the debate over the lethal targeting of HVIs continues, there is also growing 
discord over the U.S. practice of targeting unidentified militants based on their patterns of 
behavior and associates.
53
  Commonly referred to as “signature strikes,” these attacks are 
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seen alternatively as either key to gains in Afghanistan and Yemen
54
 or ineffective, and 
setting a dangerous precedent that will cause future problems for the U.S.
55
   
While questions about the legality, morality, and effectiveness of targeted killings 
remain, the U.S. has categorically embraced them as essential to the fight against Al-
Qaeda and its associated forces.  Is this due, as Klaidman and others argue to the closure 
of Guantanamo and resultant lack of detention options?   Or, as with most things in the 
world is the answer considerably more complex?   
Next we will examine the evolution of UAVs as the preferred targeted killing 
platform, and the logistical challenges presented by actually getting them to the target.  
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IMPACT OF UAV AVAILABILITY ON TARGETED KILLING 
 
There were not enough assets in this half of the galaxy for what they were asking for in 
Iraq. If we'd had 2,000 Predators, there were enough people asking for Predator time in 




In this chapter we will see that the lack of hellfire-capable UAVS or “birds” and 
bases for operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia placed significant constraints on 
U.S. policy-makers prior to 2008.  In other words U.S. policy-makers likely wanted to 
increase the use of targeted killing in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia prior to 2008, but 
lacked the military resources to do so.  After 2008, a number of factors combined to 
sharply increase the availability of UAVs for the purposes of targeted killing.  These 
factors included an increase in the supply of UAVs, a drop in demand, an increase in the 
capabilities of UAVs, and an increase in the number of available bases.   
Birds 
 
The Beginning, Kind of 
 
On August 7, 1998 two al-Qaeda truck bombs exploded in front of the U.S. 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing 224 people.  On August 20, 1998 the 
U.S. launched over 70 cruise missiles at al-Qaeda bases in Sudan and Afghanistan.  The 
strikes were ineffective as the camps were almost completely empty when the missiles 
hit.  This impotency led CIA and military leaders to call for real-time surveillance 
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capability in Afghanistan to track Bin Laden’s movements and coordinate an effective 
strike.  The Predator surveillance UAV, first used in the Balkans
57
 emerged as the most 
effective option.   
On September 7, 2000 the CIA utilized a Predator on loan from the Air Force to 
conduct its first surveillance flight over Afghanistan known as operation “Afghan Eyes.”  
According to testimony provided to the 9/11 commission, Counter-Terror Czar Richard 
Clarke, CIA Counter-Terrorism Center Director Cofer Black, and CIA Assistant Director 
of Intelligence Collection Charles Allen were all enthusiastic about the imagery this and 
follow-on flights gathered.
58
  Predator flights may have spotted Bin Laden on two 
occasions, but neither was a suitable chance for a cruise missile strike.  These missed 
opportunities prompted a call to arm the Predator in order to act on real-time surveillance.  
As it happened, a small Air Force weapons development and acquisition team known as 
“Big Safari” was already working to do this.  Air Force General John Jumper gave Big 
Safari “three months and $3 million” to fast-track the program, which produced a 
working prototype on February 16, 2001.
59
   However, the operation was grounded on 
concerns about the potential for a public relations mess if the Taliban downed a Predator, 
coupled with questions about the legality of using it for targeted killing, and whether the 
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CIA or the DOD should bear the cost.
60
  All of these concerns evaporated with the attacks 
of September 11, 2001 and the armed Predator program was given new life.   
On November 3, 2002 Lt General Michael DeLong sat on a conference call with 
CIA director George Tenant.  The subject of that call was the real-time imagery flowing 
into the CENTCOM tactical operations center (TOC) in Tampa, Florida of an SUV 
traveling along a dusty road 8,000 miles away in Yemen.  Tenant confirmed that the 
occupants of the SUV were Qa’id Salim Sinan al-Harithi one of the masterminds behind 
the October 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole, and American citizen Abu Ahmad al-Hijazi 
also known as Kamal Darwish, suspected of recruiting the members of the “Lackawana 
six” terror cell in Buffalo, New York.   Both leaders had watched real-time imagery 
before, but this time the experimental MQ-1 Predator supplying it had a Hellfire missile 
attached.  DeLong gave the order to shoot, and watched as the missile struck the vehicle 
killing all six occupants.
 61
  Five days later a visibly pleased Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Wolfowitz admitted to the strike saying  
It's a very successful tactical operation, and one hopes each time you get a success 
like that, not only to have gotten rid of somebody dangerous, but to have imposed 
changes in their tactics and operations and procedures. And sometimes when 
people are changing, they expose themselves in new ways.
62
   
                                                          
60
 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., Kean, T. H., & Hamilton, L. 
(2004). The 9/11 Commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 




 Johnston, D. & Sanger, D. (2002, November 6).   Threats and Responses: Hunt for Suspects; Fatal Strike 
in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush.  The New York Times.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/06/world/threats-responses-hunt-for-suspects-fatal-strike-yemen-was-
based-rules-set-bush.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm   
 
62
 Ressa, M. (2002, November 5).  Interview with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. CNN 
International.  Retrieved at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3264  
24 
 
The strike was the first recorded use of a UAV to conduct a targeted killing and was a 
herald of things to come.
63
   
Military leaders and policy makers alike were immediately taken with the tactical 
and strategic possibilities of UAVs.  Military leaders, stymied for years by the practical 
limits of cruise missiles, envisioned a future when they would no longer have to account 
for things like flight time to target or guidance system failures.  Instead of being forced to 
rely on notoriously inaccurate human or satellite intelligence to confirm a target’s 
location in a fixed position before launching a strike, military leaders could now 
continually observe the target over a period of days before striking at the time and place 
of their choosing; preferably when the target was within the enclosed space of a vehicle.   
Policy makers were also excited by the possibilities.  Less than a decade removed from 
the failed mission to Somalia, civilian leaders were keen to avoid sending troops into 
situations where escalation with local populations was a possibility.  In addition, when 
compared with the nearly $100 million price tag of the 75 cruise missiles launched at 
empty terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in August of 1998, the relatively modest $4 
million cost of a reusable Predator UAV equipped with a $50,000 hellfire seemed like a 
godsend for lawmakers eager to appear fiscally responsible.  Everyone was on-board the 
UAV train and ready to move full-steam ahead.  There was just one problem: the 
Predators weren’t really ready to go.   
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The Math of Battlefield Logistics  
 
As it turns out, the November 2002 strike was more of a proof of concept for the 
weaponized UAV than a coming-out party.  In fact, by December 2002, the U.S. had just 
22 UAVs theoretically capable of mounting, transporting, and launching a 100lb. Hellfire 
missile.  To the uninitiated this number seems like a lot.  However, a quick lesson in 
military logistics will help clarify the issue.    
Of the 22 UAVs in the U.S. fleet by December 2002, an undefined number were 
already configured and dedicated to non-lethal Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR) missions, further reducing the potential pool.  Then there was the 
issue of reliability.  At this early point in its development, the Predator’s “Class A” 
mishap rate, defined as the number of accidents resulting in significant damage or total 
loss per 100,000 hours of flight time, was 32 times higher than the average for manned 
military aircraft.
64
  Perhaps most damming are the Department of Defense’s own 
statistics that show the Predator’s average Mission Available Rate (MAR) hovering 
around 40%.  The MAR is a measure of how often a system is in an operable and 
committable state when the mission is called for at an unknown time.   A MAR of 40% is 
well below the Air Force average of 77%,
65
 and means that out of the initial population of 
22 Predators capable of delivering Hellfires to a target, a maximum of 9 could be 
expected to actually take-off, (let alone land safely) at any given time.  Adding to the 
shortage one must also consider that an individual Predator UAV is not a stand-alone 
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system.  Unlike manned-aircraft, the Predator system is actually comprised of four 
aircraft and a ground station necessary to maintain 24-hr coverage of a designated area of 
responsibility known as a Combat Air Patrol (CAP).
66
  The idea is that each aircraft flies 
a 6-hr patrol followed by 18-hrs for refueling and scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance.  In this manner the entire system is able to maintain “eyes-on” a given 
target, while maximizing the system’s lifespan and reliability.  The result of all these 
factors can actually be placed into an equation that is familiar to military officers charged 
with the logistics of warfare: 
(Total Vehicles x Mission Available Rate) – (Flight Hrs x Mishap Rate) ÷ Number of 
Vehicles per System = Total Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) 
In this case the number of Hellfire capable Predator UAVs available for action in 
December 2002 is calculated as: 
(22 Predators x 40% Mission Available Rate) – (~1000 Flight Hrs x 32/100K) ÷ (4 
Aircraft per System) = 2 CAPs 
To reiterate, this means that in December 2002 the U.S. had the ability to place a 
maximum of 2 Predator UAVs in the air at any given time.  This assumes that the U.S. 
got lucky and did not experience any “Class A” mishaps that would have reduced the 
number even further.  Recognizing this reality, the agency charged with overseeing the 
Predator’s development, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, 
Technology, and Logistics estimated in 2002 that it would field its first operational armed 
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Predator squadron in 2008.
 67
  If military and civilian leaders wanted this technology any 
sooner they were going to have to pay for it.    
 
Supply and Demand 
 
Predictably money was not an issue.  In 2002 forecast outlays for Predator 
Research Development Testing and Evaluation, (RDT&E) Procurement, (PROC) and 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) between fiscal years (FY) 2005 to 2008 was 
estimated at approximately $1 billion.  By 2005 the same budget forecast for Predator 
development and procurement between FY 05-08 called for spending of $1.365 billion, 
or an increase of 36%.  The additional investment paid-off as the Predator was named 
Initial Operational Capable, (IOC) defined as when a system reaches its minimally useful 
deployable form (i.e. personnel are trained to operate it, it can be maintained, etc.) in 
February 2005.  In addition, the Predator’s mishap rate had dropped to a mere 20 times 
the average for manned military aircraft, and its Mission Available Rate had improved to 
93%.  However with the U.S. now fighting two wars, supply was not keeping up with 
demand.  Despite the improvements, the number of Hellfire-capable UAVs stood at no 
more than 70.
68
  Plugging this number into our battlefield logistics equation yields: 
(70 Predators x 93% Mission Available Rate) – (~10k Flight hrs x 20/100k Mishap 
Rate) ÷ (4 Aircraft per System) = 14 CAPs 
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Our equation still lacks one more variable: namely how many are actually deployed to a 
theater of operations outside of the U.S.  Despite being unmanned, UAVs still require 
pilots to fly them and mechanics to maintain them.  Therefore, UAVs are tied to the 
personnel who make them work. Those personnel require time outside of combat 
operations for things like training and leave.  Therefore it is impossible to assume 100% 
utilization of all available systems at any given time.  While the number of Predator 
squadrons deployed in 2005 is unavailable, the author feels safe in assuming that no more 
than 70% of available UAV units were running combat operations at any given time.  
Adding this variable to the equation yields the following: 
(70 Predators x 93% Mission Available rate) x (70% Forward Deployed) – (~10k 
Flight hrs x 20/100k Mishap Rate) ÷ (4 Aircraft per System) = 11 CAPs    
While 11 birds were enough to do some damage had they been employed outside 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, there was no way that was going to happen.    Due to their 
obvious utility in a counterinsurgency fight, Predators had quickly become the new “it 
bag”
69
 for combatant commanders.  Another phenomenon that may not be readily 
apparent to the uninitiated is the fierce competition for combat enablers that occurs 
within a theater of operations.  In order to adjudicate this competition, a pecking order 
called the “priority of fires” (POF) is established.  The POF is meant to ensure that the 
highest priority missions receive all of the support that they need to be successful.  With 
an average of two Corps-level and four division-level commands deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan between 2005 and 2008, POF for Predators went something like this:  1. 
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Iraq, 2. Afghanistan, 3. Anywhere in CENTCOM Area of Responsibility outside of Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  In light of this reality it is not surprising to read the complaints of a 
targeting officer stationed with Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) 
in 2006 when he states  
If we'd had 2,000 Predators, there were enough people asking for Predator time in 
Iraq that they could have used all 2,000. It was insane. And so … unless you 
could come up with this driving piece of information that said, absolutely, no 
kidding, this is going to give me something [in Somalia], the answer was, ‘I've got 




As with any finite resource, it never helps to be third in line to receive it.   
By 2007 the number of hellfire-capable UAVs had doubled to approximately 140, 
(See fig 3.1) Mission Availability Rates remained between 90 and 93%, and the mishap 
rate continued to drop to approximately 15 times the average of manned military 
aircraft.
71
  Once again, let’s apply our knowledge of battlefield logistics to see how many 
were actually available: 
 (140 Predators/Reapers x 93% Mission Available Rate) x (70% Forward Deployed) 
– (~80k Flight hrs x 15/100k Mishap Rate) ÷ (4 Aircraft per System) = 20 CAPs 
Once again, although the number of CAPs was steadily increasing, so too was the 
demand.  By 2007, the U.S. had over 172,000 troops on the ground in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and was facing the most lethal year of the Iraq War.  
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Figure 3.1. DOD & CIA Strike-Capable UAV Inventory 2002-2013 
Source: DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2002-2013.   
 
By 2009 the supply was tipping in favor of those wanting to utilize armed UAVs 
outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Iraq war was beginning its draw-down following 
the “Surge,” of 2007-2008 and troops there were given significantly more restrictive rules 
of engagement, limiting the utility of armed UAVs.  In addition, there were now over 150 
munition-capable UAVs in the DoD and CIA inventories with dramatically improved 
MAR rates flying approximately 25 CAPs.
72
  The timing could not have been better for 
President Obama.  Faced with the challenge of how to bring the Taliban to the table on 
U.S. terms, Obama made UAVs the focus of a campaign targeting enemy fighters in the 
mountainous region of Waziristan.
73
  With the shift in focus away from Iraq, the Priority 
of Fires shifted to reflect President Obama’s policy pivot.  Now the POF list for 
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Predator/Reaper variants read:  1. Afghanistan 2. Pakistan 3. Yemen & Somalia.  This 
shift in targeting priority had an immediate effect as the U.S. launched approximately 54 
strikes in Pakistan in 2009, doubling the total from 2008.  
 Finally, by 2011 the game had completely changed.  Between the Air Force, 
Army, and CIA there were now almost 300 munition-capable UAVs in the U.S. arsenal 
capable of flying 47 simultaneous CAPs.
74
  The U.S. had completely withdrawn its forces 
from Iraq, and by any measure the number of strikes in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen 




Having told the story on birds, let’s turn to another critical factor in understanding the 
limitations imposed on UAV implementation prior to 2008.  The story of bases is a 
further limiting condition to the increase in lethal strikes.  The first generation hellfire-
capable Predator UAV had a limited flight radius of approximately 500 nautical miles, 
and could not be launched from the deck of an aircraft carrier.  Given these limitations, 
up until late 2007 there were only three bases where U.S. drones could have been 
stationed in order to reach targets in Yemen and Somalia.  In addition, drawing a 500 
nautical mile radius atop the available bases from 2001-2007, (see fig 3.2) makes it 
immediately clear that there were large areas of both Yemen and Somalia that simply 
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Figure 3.2. Comparative UAV Coverage 2001-2007 vs. 2008-2014 
Source: DOD Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap 2002-2013.  
Zenko M., & Welch E. (2012, May 29).  Where the Drones Are, Foreign Policy  
 
could not be covered by armed UAVs during this period.
75
   In October 2007 the new 
hellfire-capable UAV known as the “Reaper” registered its first kill.  The Reaper 
represented a marked upgrade, tripling the flight radius to 1,655 nautical miles, and the 
weapons payload from 500 lbs. to 3,750lbs.
76
 
This increase in payload meant that the Reaper could carry a wide array of both 
lethal munitions and non-lethal sensor equipment on the same bird.  This eliminated the 
need to compartmentalize lethal vs. non-lethal missions by configuring the UAV 
beforehand.   The upgrade in capability combined with more bases from which to operate 
made the availability of armed UAVs much more likely to be seen as a suitable, feasible, 
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and acceptable military solution (as opposed to cruise missiles or manned raids) to the 
problem of al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate operations in the region.
 77
      
Weather 
 
In addition to the issues of base availability and the limited range of first-
generation UAVs, weather and issues of territorial sovereignty were also important 
factors completely limiting the use of UAVs.  Both Yemen and Somalia are subject to 
high-intensity dust storms commonly known as “Shamals” or “Haboobs.”  These storms 
frequently ground even the most dedicated U.S. air-assets in the region including 
UAVs.
78
  Although they increase in intensity in the spring and summer months, these 
storms occur throughout the year, and are a frequent obstacle to U.S. flight operations.  
One way to overcome the issue of the storms is to have multiple locations from which to 
launch and recover aircraft.  From 2001-2007 there were only three such base locations.  
By 2011, the U.S. had seven bases available, greatly increasing flexibility to overcome 
the limiting effects of local environmental factors.    
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 Predictably these assets are helicopters dedicated to Air Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) of casualties.  
These flights are known to take-off in hazardous conditions that would ground any civilian flight along 
with combat patrols.  However, during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the catastrophic effects of sand and 
dust on both visibility and equipment would routinely place MEDEVAC aircraft in a no-fly or “Red” 
status, forcing troops to evacuate casualties via ground transportation.     
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Host Nation Concerns 
Further, issues of territorial sovereignty can greatly limit military flexibility.  In 
February 2007, after reports surfaced that the U.S. had launched at least two attacks on 
Somali militants from its airbase at Arba Minch, the Ethiopian government expelled the 
U.S. forces.
79
  The closure severely curtailed U.S. overflight capability in Somalia, and 
required nearly four years of careful diplomacy before the U.S. was allowed to return.  
Today the U.S. uses the Arba Minch airbase as a primary launching point for UAV 
flights into Somalia, but the incident underscores another potential constraint on UAV 
operations in the region.  In addition the continued presence of U.S. UAV’s in countries 
like Seychelles, and the Philippines is contingent upon their use for surveillance 
operations only.  Should it come out that an armed operation took place from one of these 
countries, it is likely that the U.S. would lose access to these bases.     
Host nation concerns about the safety of the UAVs can also play a role.  Between 
2011 and 2014 there were seven crashes involving Predator and Reaper variant drones 
flying from airbases in Djibouti and the Seychelles.  These crashes had a real effect on 
U.S. operations.  All UAV flights in the Seychelles were grounded in November 2012 
after two Reapers crashed there in five months.
80
  Then, in September 2013 U.S. forces 
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were forced to relocate drone operations in Djibouti to a remote airstrip away from 
civilian population after five crashes in a two-year period.
81
    
UAV limitations, environmental disruptions, and changeable host-nation support 
for operations all help to explain why the U.S. was limited in its ability to conduct lethal 
strikes using UAVs out of the three bases it operated in the region prior to 2008.  These 
factors also help to explain why the U.S. continues to expand its UAV basing options 
despite achieving what appears to be redundant coverage in the region by 2012.
82
   
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the lack of hellfire-capable UAVs and bases for 
operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia placed significant constraints on U.S. policy-
makers prior to 2008.  It then showed that the increase in availability of UAVs after 2008 
allowed for a rapid expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program.  Therefore, we have 
additional evidence that the surge in targeted killings beginning in 2008 was not a 
function as Klaidman argues of a policy change, but rather of a lack of opportunity prior 
to 2008, and an increase in opportunity thereafter.  In the next chapter we will examine 
how evolving legal treatment of terror suspects steadily increased the lethality of the U.S. 
approach. 
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 In 2013 the U.S. announced that it would open a new UAV base in Niamy, Niger in order to support 
French-led operations against AQ affiliated militants in Mali.  The base gives the U.S. capability to expand 
UAV coverage into the majority of western Africa.  Schmitt, E. (2013, February 22).  New Drone Base in 






THE EXECUTIVE’S EVOLVING LEGAL APPROACH TO TERROR SUSPECTS & 
THE INCREASE IN LETHALITY 
 
After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies 
with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States. 




On February 26, 1993 Ramzi Yousef, the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed 
parked a van laden with explosives in the parking garage below New York’s World Trade 
Center.  The explosion killed six, wounded over 1,000 and marked the beginning of 
United States’ long and challenging struggle with Al-Qaeda and its associates.  The U.S. 
response to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates can be broken into three distinct epochs that are 
characterized by shifting views within the executive branch on the best legal way to treat 
terror suspects: The law enforcement epoch which lasted from 1993 until the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the interrogation epoch from 2001 until 2007, and the drone war 
epoch from 2008 until the present day.  This chapter will argue that the relatively small 
increase in targeted killing during the interrogation epoch can be explained by the focus 
on interrogation, coupled with the lag in UAV availability.  Furthermore, it will argue 
that the drone war epoch began with the legal defeat of the Bush administration’s 
detention and interrogation programs, combined with a surge in UAV availability.  We 
will see that the drone war epoch has been characterized by an increase in the frequency 
of personality strikes, and the massive expansion of signature strikes.  Finally it will 
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highlight the continued relevance of the U.S. criminal court system, and the Department 
of Justice’s attempts to increase its ability to try both domestic and international 
terrorists.    
The Law Enforcement Epoch (1993-2000) 
 
The response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing was categorically 
different than the attacks that brought the same buildings down less than a decade later.  
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, a massive response from local, state, federal, 
and international law enforcement began the search for the individuals responsible for the 
attack.  Within two weeks, the FBI had arrested four out of eight total identified 
conspirators within U.S. borders.  From there the hunt went international.  With 
cooperation from local intelligence and law enforcement personnel, the U.S. secured the 
capture and extradition of three additional conspirators from Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan.  
Every defendant in the case was found guilty and sentenced to 240 years in prison.
84
   
The response to this attack is hailed by proponents of the law-enforcement 
paradigm as an example of the effectiveness of U.S. civilian law-enforcement and 
international cooperation.   However, the attacks and plots kept coming.  In 1995 the 
Philippine National Police disrupted an Al-Qaeda plot to bomb 11 U.S. airliners and 
crash another into the CIA headquarters.  In 1998 Al-Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassy 
buildings in Kenya and Tanzania killing 240 people.  The U.S. response to this attack 
included the launching of over 70 cruise missiles at Al-Qaeda bases in Sudan and 
Afghanistan.  The missile attacks were largely ineffective and seen more as a show of 
                                                          
84




force, but were a signal that the U.S. was willing to entertain military options to extend 
its reach into territory outside the control of cooperative governments.  In 1999 
authorities in the U.S. and Jordan stopped a plot to attack Americans at millennial 
activities in Jordan and at Los Angeles International Airport.  Finally, in October, 2000 
al-Qaeda operatives attacked the U.S.S. Cole while at port in Aden.  In total the U.S. 
brought indictments against approximately 40 members of Al-Qaeda in connection with 
these attacks and plots, and was able to capture and secure convictions on 20 of them 
prior to September 11, 2001 (see Table 4.1).   
Table 4.1. Status of Al-Qaeda Terrorists Indicted for Crimes 1993-2000 
Terror Suspects for AQ Crimes '93-'00 Arrested Convicted Guantanamo Killed At Large as of 9/10/01 
40 20 20 0 0 20 
 
With the exception of the 1998 cruise missile attacks the U.S. largely eschewed 
the use of targeted killing during this epoch as a means of dealing with Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates.  Instead, America’s demonstrated preference was to deal with each terrorist on 
a case-by-case basis through civilian law-enforcement and partner nation relationships.   
Less than a year after the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, that would begin to change.  
The Interrogation Epoch (2001-2007) 
 
The attacks of 9/11 marked the shift from the law-enforcement to the 
interrogation epoch.  By 2007, two of the 20 individuals who had escaped capture and 
trial for crimes committed during the law enforcement epoch would be held in 
39 
 
extrajudicial detention in Guantanamo, and another four would be dead as a result of 
direct action with U.S. forces or targeted strikes (see Table 4.2).   
 
Table 4.2. Status of Al-Qaeda Terrorists Indicted for Crimes 1993-2000 
Terror Suspects for AQ Crimes '93-'00 Arrested Convicted Guantanamo Killed At Large as of 12/31/07 
40 20 20 2 5 13 
 
Viewing law-enforcement as inadequate to combat the threat President Bush remarked in 
his 2005 state of the union address:   
I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They view 
terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement 
and indictments.  After the World Trade Center was first attacked in 1993, some 
of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent to prison. But the 
matter was not settled. The terrorists were still training and plotting in other 
nations and drawing up more ambitious plans.  After the chaos and carnage of 
September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The 




Within 72 hours of the attack, Congress passed the “Joint resolution to authorize the use 
of the United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks 
launched against the United States.” More commonly known as the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force, (AUMF) the document gave the Presidency broad powers to 
declare a “War on Terrorism,” and bring the military into the fight against Al-Qaeda and 
its associates.  Now, in addition to civilian law enforcement options, the U.S. had 
authorized itself to capture and hold Al-Qaeda fighters in military detention facilities as 
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well as to kill them upon identification consistent with the laws of land warfare.   This 
shift from a peacetime legal footing to a wartime stance marked the beginning of the U.S. 
targeted killing program, but did not open the floodgates in the way that many outside 
observers of the Bush administration may have guessed it would.   
The reason for this relative lack of lethality was intelligence.  After 9/11, U.S. 
military and civilian leadership realized that it had very little in the way of knowledge 
about the global workings of Al-Qaeda.  As the 9/11 Commission Report states:  
The intelligence community struggled throughout the 1990s and up to 9/11 to 
collect intelligence on and analyze the phenomenon of transnational terrorism. 
The combination of an overwhelming number of priorities, flat budgets, an 
outmoded structure, and bureaucratic rivalries resulted in an insufficient response 
to this new challenge.
86
  
The most direct route to gain that knowledge was to capture and interrogate members of 
al-Qaeda.  In order to do this the U.S. military established an extensive network of 
detention centers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, while the CIA established 
multiple so-called “black-sites” around the world.  The military detention centers in Iraq 
and Afghanistan primarily housed members of the respective nation’s insurgent 
population or the al-Qaeda in Iraq affiliate, and were required to act in accordance with 
all applicable laws of war.  By 2005, following an overhaul of the military’s detention 
system after the Abu Ghuraib torture scandal, all detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
subject to a two-week legal review after which time the individual was either charged 
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with a crime under the host-nation’s laws or released.
87
  This system allowed for the 
eventual transfer of all detainees in U.S. custody to the host nation.  This process was 
complete in Iraq by December 2011, and is ongoing in Afghanistan.   
Whereas detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan were meant to combat the 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, Guantanamo and the CIA black-sites were reserved 
for members of Al-Qaeda’s international enterprise.  Within these extrajudicial facilities, 
military and CIA interrogators conducted aggressive “enhanced” interrogations approved 
by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the Secretary of Defense aimed at gathering 
intelligence to capture top Al-Qaeda leaders and prevent future attacks.
88
    
However, a series of Supreme Court decisions eroded the administration’s claim 
that Guantanamo was an extraterritorial facility and not subject to U.S. law.  In 2004 the 
court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees could legally challenge their 
detention in a court of law.  In response, the administration instituted the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (CRST) process wherein each case was internally reviewed on a 
yearly basis, but blocked access to attorney representation and allowed evidence obtained 
under interrogation.  In the 2006 decision Hamadan v. Rumsfeld, the court ruled that the 
administration's planned military commissions violated U.S. and international law. In 
addition, it agreed with the plaintiffs that that the protections of the Geneva Conventions 
applied to Guantánamo detainees.  Finally in the June 2008 ruling Boumediene v. Bush, 
the court rejected the CRST process, and again asserted that the detainees must be 
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accorded the right to challenge their detention in a real court before a neutral judge.
89
  
These landmark decisions would effectively end the use of Guantanamo, with the last 
detainee arriving in March 2008.  
In addition to the challenges presented by the Supreme Court decisions, the Bush 
administration faced growing controversy over whether the “enhanced” interrogation 
techniques used on the detainees amounted to torture under U.S. and international law.  
By the summer of 2008, a significant minority within Congress was calling for the 
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the practice, and the acting head of the 
OLC issued a memo wherein he stated: 
The federal prohibition on torture, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, is constitutional, 
and I believe it does apply as a general matter to the subject of detention and 
interrogation of detainees conducted pursuant to the President's Commander in 
Chief authority. The statement to the contrary from the August 1, 2002, 
memorandum, quoted above, has been withdrawn and superseded, along with the 
entirety of the memorandum, and in any event I do not find that statement 
persuasive. The President, like all officers of the Government, is not above the 
law. He has a sworn duty to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and to 




The memo was essentially a repudiation of the interrogation practices of the previous 
seven years, and effectively marked the end of their use by military and CIA 
interrogators.  
                                                          
89
 (2008, June 12).  Boumediene v. Bush / Al Odah v. United States, Center for Constitutional Rights.  
Retrieved from https://www.ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/al-odah-v.-united-states  
 
90
 Bradbury, S. (2009, January 15).  Re: Status of Certain OLC opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the 





 As a result of the focus on intelligence gathering between 2001 and 2007, the 
Bush administration detained 779 individuals at Guantanamo,
91
 and another 136 through 
extraordinary rendition to black-sites in third party nations.
92
 During the same period, the 
administration authorized a relatively meager 18 targeted strikes, killing approximately 5 
HVIs and 216 of their associates.
93
  Meanwhile the Department of Justice indicted and 
tried 194 individuals on federal terrorism charges, securing 62 convictions with an 
average sentence of 206 months.
94
  The numbers reveal that despite a demonstrated 
willingness to use lethal force against terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bush 
administration’s policies resulted in a relatively small expansion of the targeted killing 
program between 2001 and 2007.  2008 would be different, and marks the transition to 
the third and final epoch.    
The Drone War Epoch (2008-Present) 
 
At the end of 2007 there were 13 remaining suspects who were still at large for 
crimes committed during the law enforcement epoch.  By April, 2014 only four 
remained.  Nine had been killed, and one captured (see table 4.3).   
Table 4.3. Status of Al-Qaeda Terrorists Indicted for Crimes 1993-2000 
Terror Suspects for AQ Crimes '93-'00 Arrested Convicted GTMO KIA At Large as of 4/30/14 
40 20 20 2 14 4 
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While these individuals represent a small fraction of the total, their deaths are 
representative of a larger trend towards greater lethality.   
Klaidman and others claim that the expansion of targeted killing program has its 
roots in the closure of Guantanamo and CIA black sites which left no viable detention 
option for enemy combatants outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.  This argument has a flaw.  
It assumes that the U.S. would have had an interest in capturing and interrogating the 
majority of the individuals it killed after 2008. There is no doubt that targeted killing of 
HVIs, (who the U.S. presumably would have liked to detain and interrogate) increased 
after the closure of Guantanamo.  Between 2001 and 2007, the U.S. killed seven HVIs.  
Since 2008, the U.S. has killed 82 HVIs.  What Klaidman et al do not account for is that 
this number is a small fraction of the overall expansion.  The majority of those killed 
since 2008 have not been HVIs.  Unknown, low-level militants are not likely to possess 
much in the way of actionable intelligence, and were simply ignored outside of Iraq and 
Afghanistan prior to 2008, but were not so fortunate after.  Between January 2008 and 
December 2013, the U.S. killed approximately 887 individuals in targeted strikes in 
Somalia and Yemen.  Of those, 688 or 70% are listed as either “unknown” or 
“militant.”
95
 This means that instead of simply killing those it would have captured prior 
to 2008; the U.S. was now killing many who never would have rated capture to begin 
with.  Why was the U.S. doing this, and how was it justifying it? 
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Signature Strikes, Imminent Threat, and the Expansion of Targeted Killing 
 
In January 2008, stung by the failures of its extrajudicial detention and 
interrogation programs, and buoyed by the increase in the availability of UAVs, the Bush 
administration quietly negotiated an agreement with Pakistan to increase the intensity of 
strikes against suspected terrorists operating along the border with Afghanistan.  Included 
within the agreement was the understanding that the U.S. would begin targeting 
anonymous individuals or groups “that bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda or Taliban 
leaders on the run.” 
96
 The birth of so-called “signature strikes” marked the true 
beginning of the expansion of the U.S. targeted killing program.  Now, instead of waiting 
for days or months at a time to identify an individual known to be a terrorist leader, UAV 
operators and intelligence analysts could nominate a target based solely on his pattern of 
life.  This controversial targeting methodology exponentially increased the number of 
possible targets, and inevitably led to a rapid increase in the number of lethal strikes.   
While the U.S. has never officially acknowledged its use of signature strikes, it 
has quietly laid some of the groundwork for a legal defense of them.  In his May 2013 
speech on drones President Obama stated:  
America does not take strikes to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who 
pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there 
are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat.  And before 
any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or 
injured -- the highest standard we can set.
97  
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The specific language used in this passage is important.  First, the use of the term 
‘imminent and continuing threat’ provides the legal foundation for all targeted killing 
under the self-defense clause of Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.
 98
   The question of who 
actually constitutes an imminent threat is critical to the justification of signature strikes, 
and is answered in the same sentence.  That every individual purposefully killed via 
targeted killing has represented an imminent and continuing threat to Americans is a 
deliberate move to avoid setting boundaries such as “the U.S. homeland.” This distinction 
allows the administration to argue for example that U.S. signature strikes in Pakistan are 
targeting groups of armed men who represent an “imminent threat” to American troops in 
Afghanistan.    
The DOJ Holds Its Own:  Material Support for Terrorism Statute 
 
Although the majority of focus since 2008 has been on those killed in targeted 
strikes, it is important to note that the U.S. has also quietly continued prosecuting 
terrorists within the civilian law enforcement system.  Despite fits and stutters like the 
November 2009 failed attempt to try 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in New 
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York, the U.S. Department of Justice has secured terrorist convictions on approximately 
150 individuals since 2008.
99
  Many of these convictions reflect a willingness on the part 
of the DOJ to push the envelope of U.S. jurisdiction over terror-related crimes.   
Due to the case-by-case nature of the law, there is no catch-all that allows the U.S. 
to simply capture and try every individual it considers a terrorist in U.S. court.  If federal 
prosecutors are unable to prove that a suspected terrorist’s crimes had a U.S. nexus, that 
individual is not subject to U.S. law, and cannot not have civilian charges levied against 
him.  This makes pre-emptive prosecution particularly problematic as it is difficult to 
prove the intent of the individual.  As a result, the majority of high-profile prosecutions 
of international terrorists such as those of Abu Ghaith, the son-in-law of Osama Bin 
Laden, and Anas al-Libi come against individuals who were investigated and indicted for 
their participation in previous attacks against the U.S.   
Perhaps in a bid to overcome some of the difficulty associated with pre-emptive 
prosecution of terrorists, prosecutors have increasingly cited violations of the “Material 
Support for Terrorism” Statute 18 USC 2339B of 1996 which makes it unlawful, within 
the United States, or for any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
anywhere, to knowingly provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization that 
has been designated by the Secretary of State.
100
  As the NYU center for law and security 
explains it, “material support can range from raising $300 for al-Shabab to attempting to 
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provide anti-aircraft missiles for Al-Qaeda and have included the provision of personnel, 
communications, technical assistance, and the defendant’s person and services.”
101
 Since 
2008 over 80% of terrorism cases have included a material support charge. The use of 
this statute is significant as it does not require proof of the defendant’s intent that the 
material support go to illegal activities.  While most applications of 18 USC 2339B have 
come against U.S. citizens and permanent residents, usually of Somali origin, there has 
been one conviction and three pending cases of international terrorists.   
On March 8 2010, Mohamed Ibrahim Ahmed was arrested in Nigeria and sent to 
New York where he was charged with providing and conspiring to provide material 
support to the militant Somali group, al-Shabab.  In March 2013, Ahmed was convicted 
and sentenced to 9 years in federal prison despite his lawyer’s argument that his support 
for al-Shabab “had nothing to do with the United States.”
102
  Additionally, on December 
21, 2012 three men, Ali Yasin Ahmed, Mahdi Hashi, Mohamed Yusuf were detained by 
authorities in Djibouti en-route to Yemen.
103
  These cases are interesting in that their only 
link to U.S. jurisdiction is their participation in al-Shabab training, and have ignited a 
minor controversy over the limits of U.S. jurisdiction and the material support statute.  
After the men’s indictment the U.S. attorney for the Eastern District of New York stated, 
“We will use every tool at our disposal to combat terrorist groups, deter terrorist activity 
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and incapacitate individual terrorists.”
104
  Convictions in these cases would further 
strengthen the case law of the material support statute.  However, while the concept of 
broad power to try terrorists may be attractive on the surface, the practicality of such an 
approach can certainly be questioned as the attorney for Mohamed Yusuf argues “the last 
thing in the world we really need to do is apprehend and lock-up 10,000 al-Shabab 
fighters or bring them into the court system.”
105
 Therefore, while the DOJ continues to 
seek terrorism convictions, its focus will likely remain on domestic issues, allowing the 
DOD and CIA to lead the fight overseas.  
Conclusion  
 
The U.S. response to Al-Qaeda and its affiliates has been characterized by a shift 
from a sole reliance on law enforcement, to extrajudicial detention and interrogation, and 
finally to large-scale targeted killing.  The next chapter will examine why the expansion 
of the U.S. targeted killing program has not followed a steady upward curve, but instead 
has been a story of spikes and troughs.  
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CONTEXT MATTERS  
 
The elevated threat expanded the scope of people we could go after in Yemen. Before, 
we couldn’t necessarily go after a driver for the organization; it’d have to be an 
operations director. Now that driver becomes fair game because he’s providing direct 




UAVs Don’t Kill People, People Do 
 
The availability of UAVs and the executive branches’ evolving legal approach to 
terror suspects, explain a great deal about the expansion of the U.S. targeted killing 
program after 2008.  One cannot however, simply extrapolate upon the findings chapters 
III and IV. If one did, the expectation would be to see a steady upward trend in the 
number of targeted killings in line with the increase in capacity and increasingly 
permissive targeting environment (see fig 5.1).    
The reality is more nuanced.  This chapter argues that UAV availability and the 
legal approach to terror suspects must be superimposed upon an understanding of current 
and past events that influence the decision-maker’s choice of whether or not to launch a 
given strike.  In other words, each strike is a discrete event.  The individual tasked with 
final authorization for that strike is heavily influenced by both past and current events.  
As a result, the number of strikes rise and fall as decision-makers are continually 
influenced by the context they operate within.   
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Figure 5.1.  Number of U.S. Strikes by Year (Theoretical) 
 
At first glance, the most authoritative charts used by journalists, scholars, and 
think tanks to chronicle the number of strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia tell a 
familiar story:  From 2008 to 2010, the number of strikes in Pakistan rises sharply while 
strikes in Yemen and Somalia remain sparse.  In 2011, the strikes begin to shift away 
from Pakistan towards Yemen which ends up with the majority in 2012 (See fig 5.2 for a 
good example).
107
 While such charts are useful in to paint the aggregate picture of UAV 
strikes, there has been little work done to qualitatively analyze them alongside the events 
that drive them.  What follows is an attempt to apply such analysis to the pattern of lethal 
strikes in the two countries that have received far less attention academic attention than 
Pakistan: Yemen and Somalia. 
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Figure 5.2. U.S. Drone Strikes 




Let us first examine the lethal strike record of Yemen on a month-to-month basis.  
Pulling data from the two most respected databases of known and suspected U.S. UAV 
strikes,
108
 it is immediately apparent that the aggregate increase after 2008 is actually the 
result of several discrete spikes (See fig 5.3).   
 
Yemen Spike I: August to October 2011 
 
The first spike in lethal strikes occurred from August to October 2011.  During 
this three-month period, the U.S. launched eleven strikes, equal to all previous lethal 
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Figure 5.3. U.S. Strikes in Yemen 2009-2013 
Source: New America Foundation & Bureau of Investigative Journalism. 
 
In order to understand the real world events that influenced this spike, one must 
begin almost eleven years prior, to the October 12, 2000 attack on the U.S.S. Cole.  The 
Al-Qaeda plot used a small boat laden with explosives to bomb the U.S.S. Cole, a Navy 
Destroyer while it rested at anchor in the Yemen port city of Aden.  The attack killed 17 
sailors and placed Yemen firmly into the consciousness of U.S. decision-makers and 
counterterrorism experts.  With the assistance of U.S. law-enforcement, the Yemeni 
government rounded up two of the alleged perpetrators Nasir Ahmad Nasir al-Bahri, and 
Jamel Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi.  Their trial in Yemen and the resulting 
sentences marked the beginning of a long-string of U.S. frustration with the Yemen 
government’s inability or unwillingness to take decisive action against members of Al-
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Qaeda operating within its borders.  Of the seven U.S.S. Cole suspects, four were 
captured and eventually given full-pardons by the Yemeni government, while an 
additional three remained at large until they were killed by U.S. drone strikes. (See table 
5.1).     
Table 5.1.  Disposition of U.S.S. Cole Suspects October 2000 – Present 
Nasir Ahmad Nasir al-Bahri Captured 2000 by Yemeni authorities.  Participated in 
Jihadist rehab program and released in 2002.  Given a 
full pardon and still living in Yemen.  
Jamel Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al-
Badawi  
Captured by Yemeni authorities in 2000 and sentenced 
to 15 years in prison.  Escaped in April 2003 with 10 
others including U.S.S. Cole co-conspirator Fahd 
Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso.  He was recaptured later 
that year and sentenced to death in 2004.  On February 
2006 Al-Badawi was one of 23 Al-Qaeda fighters who 
escaped Sana’a prison.  In 2007 Al-Badawi 
surrendered to the Yemeni authorities, and despite an 
existing $5 million reward offered by the U.S. 
department of Justice, was given a full pardon in 
exchange for a pledge to renounce terrorist activities. 
Jaber El Baneh Convicted for his role in the attack in 2004.  Escaped in 
2006 with several co-conspirators.  Turned himself in 
May 2007 and given full pardon.  Continues to live in 
Yemen.  
Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-Quso Captured in 2000.  Escaped in April 2003 with 10 
others including U.S.S. Cole co-conspirator Jamel 
Ahmed Mohammed al-Badawi. Recaptured and 
sentenced to 10 years by Yemeni authorities on 
September 29th, 2004.  Released in 2007.  Implicated 
in the 2009 Underwear Bombing Attack.  Killed by 
U.S. Drone Strike May 6, 2012.   
Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi Remained at large until killed in the first lethal drone 
strike in Yemen on November 3, 2002 along with 
American citizen Kamel Derwish.  
Abdul Mun'im Salim al-Fatahani Remained at large until killed by a drone strike in 
Yemen on February 3, 2012.  
Midhat Mursi Remained at large until killed by a drone strike in 
Pakistan on August 3, 2008.  
 
The story of the U.S.S. Cole suspects and the resulting lack of faith on the part of 
U.S. policy-makers in the Yemeni justice system is the first influencing factor leading to 
the U.S.’s 2011 spike in UAV strikes on Yemen targets.  After the attacks of September 
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11, 2001 and the resulting pivot of U.S. interest to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, there 
is little that occurs to influence the spike until September 17, 2008 when Al-Qaeda in 
Yemen launched a complex attack against the U.S. embassy in Sana’a, Yemen.  The 
attack killed 18 including one American, and was later called ‘a wake-up call for all of 
Washington’ by the U.S. Ambassador to Yemen, Edward Hull.
109
 
Then, on January 24, 2009 a revitalized Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) released an online video entitled “From Here We Begin and at Al-Aqsa We 
Meet.” The video announced the merger of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of AQAP 
under the leadership of Abu Basir Nasir al-Wuhayshi along with former Guantanamo 
detainee Saeed Ali al-Shihri, and vowed continued action against oil facilities, tourists, 
and security forces.
110
  The video brought Yemen and AQAP back to the forefront of 
concern of U.S. intelligence and policy-makers.   
In response, top U.S. counter-terrorism leaders including CENTCOM 
Commander General David Petraeus, and Obama administration counter-terrorism czar 
John Brennan met several times between June and September 2009 with Yemeni 
president Ali Abdullah Saleh to discuss increased U.S. support for Yemeni counter-
terrorism efforts.  These meetings ended with the U.S. receiving approval to operate 
independently within Yemen to pursue AQAP.    
Next, on November 5, 2009 U.S. Army MAJ Nidal Malik Hasan entered a pre-
deployment medical screening at Ft. Hood, Texas and opened fire killing 13 and 
wounding 30.  In the immediate aftermath it was revealed that Hasan had engaged in 
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extensive email correspondence with the radical cleric and naturalized U.S. citizen 
Anwar al-Awlaki.  Al-Awlaki had been hiding in Yemen after fleeing the U.S. in 2007 
and was at the time of the Ft. Hood shootings considered to be the senior spiritual leader 
of AQAP.     
Quickly on the heels of the Ft. Hood shooting, the U.S. launched an attack using 
cruise missiles at a suspected AQAP training camp.  The attack killed nearly 60 people 
including at least 44 civilians, and was a diplomatic debacle.    Although the Yemeni 
government took responsibility for the attack, State Department cables released by 
wikileaks would later reveal that this was a covering measure, and President Saleh 
requested that future strikes be carried out by precision platforms like UAVs in order to 
minimize civilian casualties.  The use of cruise missiles in this instance is an excellent 
indicator that the general lack of availability of UAVs was still playing a major role in 
limiting the number of targeted killings outside of Iraq and Afghanistan.  Remember from 
chapter III, that there were only 20 Combat Air Patrols available in 2007 with over 
170,000 troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.  As a result, Yemen was still relatively 
low on the Priority of Fire (POF) pecking order at the time; forcing military decision-
makers to use less-reliable technology with disastrous consequences.  The strike marks 
the last time cruise missiles were used in Yemen.   
On December 25, 2009, 23-year old Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab 
attempted to bring-down Northwest Airlines Flight 253 with a bomb concealed in his 
underwear.  AQAP claimed credit for the failed attempt and hailed it as a success as 
western governments scrambled to update their airline passenger screening process.
 111
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The U.S. specifically tied the attack to al-Awlaki, and in April 2010 placed him on the 
Joint Prioritized Effects List or JPEL populated by over 2,000 individuals considered to 
be directly engaged in planning, resourcing, or executing terrorist attacks against the 
United States.
112
  Al-Awlaki’s addition to the list meant that he could now be lethally 
targeted.  In May 2010, a UAV under the control of the U.S. Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) launched a disastrous strike against regional AQAP leader 
Mohammed Saeed Jardan.  The strike missed its target and instead killed Jaber al-
Shawbani the deputy governor of the Marib province who was attempting to reconcile 
Jardan to the Yemeni government.  The botched strike caused a massive backlash, 
particularly in Marib province of Yemen where it sparked an anti-government uprising,
113
 
and the U.S. did not launch another lethal strike in Yemen for a year. 
On October 29, 2010 two packages with bomb material hidden in toner-cartridges 
were found on separate UPS flights bound from Yemen to the U.S.  AQAP quickly 
claimed responsibility for the attempted bombings and for the crash of UPS Airlines 
Flight 6.  Although the latter claim was never substantiated, the attempted attack added to 
the sense of urgency within the U.S. counter-terrorism apparatus.     
                                                                                                                                                                             
intelligence officers, SIGINT collectors, and intelligence analysts were put on planes to beef up the CIA 
station in Sana’a.  NSA and its SIGINT partners in Great Britain and Australia immediately began 
intercepting all international telephone calls going into or coming out of Yemen.  The Saleh government 
gave the CIA permission to conduct daily Predator drone missions over the southern part of the country 
from Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, and the U.S. Navy was allowed to begin flying manned reconnaissance 
missions over southern Yemen from warships stationed offshore.  There was also a dramatic influx of 
Green Berets from the 5
th
 Special Forces Group to intensify the training of Yemeni counterterrorist units at 
a special training camp in Dhamar Province south of Sana’a.” Aid, Matthew M. 2012. Intel wars: the secret 
history of the fight against terror. New York: Bloomsbury Press. (p. 149). 
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In the three months prior to our August-October 2011 spike, the U.S. executed six 
attacks under the control of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).  As the 
strikes were under the control of the DOD, they were subject to a number of legal 
restrictions including the law of war and the status of forces agreement with Yemen 
governing U.S. military personnel.  At least one of these strikes on May 5, 2011 appears 
to have been an attempt to lethally target al-Awlaki, but the rest appear to have focused 
on local AQAP militants fighting against the Yemeni regime rather than internationally 
known terrorists. 
By July 2011, AQAP had exploited instability related to the Arab Spring to seize 
control of the majority of eastern Yemen (See fig 5.4).  As the Obama administration 
became increasingly concerned that President Saleh would lose control of the country or 
cede power to a government hostile to the U.S., it took steps to ensure continued UAV  
access.  Key amongst these steps was the decision announced in June 2011 to authorize 
the CIA to conduct lethal strikes in the country.   
 
 
Figure 5.4. Division in Yemen as of July 7, 2011 
Source: Political Geography Now 
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At this point, the U.S. had also completed an additional UAV base in the desert of 
southern Saudi Arabia from which to launch strikes if its access to Yemen was cut-off.
114
  
The shift to CIA-led strikes marked a significant change in policy.  Previous strikes 
undertaken by the DOD had to be approved by the Yemeni government and only after 
ground intelligence confirmed the presence of a named target.  The CIA was expected to 
bring its “pattern of life” targeting philosophy which was first used in Pakistan and 
targeted individuals and groups based on their behavior over a period of persistent 
surveillance which was deemed to meet the profile of Al-Qaeda or affiliated militants.
115
   
This then is context in sequence.  At the beginning of August 2011 U.S. decision-
makers faced a resurgent AQAP whose previous actions left no question of its intent to 
strike U.S. targets.  Due to previous mishaps with conventional munitions, those same 
decision-makers knew that anything but precision strikes would be unacceptable.  In 
addition, they were handed a permissive operating environment as the Saleh government 
fought to maintain power and welcomed strikes against AQAP as assistance in a civil 
war.  These factors all led to an inevitable conclusion: in the very near future the U.S. 
was going to use drones to kill a lot more people in Yemen.   
 
Yemen Spike II: March to August 2012 
 
This first spike in strikes culminated in the September 30, 2011 strike which 
killed Anwar al-Awlaki and fellow U.S. citizen Samir Khan.  It was only the beginning.  
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By February 27, 2012 popular opposition to President Ali Abdullah Saleh reached a 
tipping point and he was forced to cede power to his deputy Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi 
after 33 years of rule.
116
  Upon assuming power, President Hadi’s first order of business 
was to regain territory lost to AQAP.  In March 2012 the government offensive began, 
marking the second spike in our sequence. In support of Yemeni military operations, the 
U.S. launched 62 strikes from March to August 2012 killing over 400.  Amongst those 
killed were key AQAP figures like Mohammed Al-Umda, the fourth most wanted 
terrorist in Yemen, Muhammed Fazi al-Harasheh the nephew of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, 
Fahd al-Quso, a key U.S.S. Cole suspect, and Abdulrahman al-Wuhayshi, the younger 
brother of AQAP’s leader.  Despite these high-profile deaths, this spike is interesting for 
the number of strikes on individuals who were more a threat to the Yemeni government 
than to the U.S.  The U.S. has never admitted to targeting anyone at the request of 
another government.  However, the New York Times recently revealed that the U.S. 
targeted individuals in Pakistan in order to gain access for its own strikes.  Mark Mazzetti 
writes:  
The target was not a top operative of Al Qaeda, but a Pakistani ally of the 
Taliban who led a tribal rebellion and was marked by Pakistan as an enemy of the 
state. In a secret deal, the C.I.A. had agreed to kill him in exchange for access to 





This revelation, when combined with an analysis of all 62 strikes in the second Yemen 
spike reveals what Micha Zenko puts bluntly when he states: “We don’t say that we’re 
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the counterinsurgency air force of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, but we are.”
118
  In short, 
the U.S. has engaged its UAV fleet to kill not only its direct enemies, but also those of its 
host nation partners.  Whether done to gain or maintain access, or support regimes 
friendly to U.S. counter-terror policies, this action represents a significant factor in the 
increase in strikes since 2008.  In addition, the policy weakens the moral defense of U.S. 
targeted killing program, as it is more complicated, (although not impossible) to argue 
that fighting other people’s wars is an act of self-defense.  
 
Yemen Spike III: July to August 2013 
 
On September 11, 2012 over 100 Islamic militants launched a series of attacks 
against the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  The 
attacks took place over 8 hours and left four Americans including the U.S. Ambassador to 
Libya dead.  Although this attack did not take place in Yemen, and was not the work of 
AQAP, a quick look at the third spike in Yemen may reveal the importance of this event.    
On May 29
th
, 2013 in response to gathering outcry against drone strikes and 
reports of mounting civilian casualties, President Obama delivered an address at the 
National Defense University signaling a change in policy which would significantly 
curtail the use of targeted killing, stating that the U.S. would not carry out strikes when 
capture is an available option.
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 “America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists; our preference 
is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute.  America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our 
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This shift in policy seems to have curtailed the number of strikes in Yemen 
significantly until the third and final spike from late July to late August 2013 when the 
U.S. launched ten additional lethal strikes including six within a 72-hr period.  The so 
called “terror threat strikes” were a response to an intercepted communication between 
Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri and AQAP’s leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi wherein the 
former exhorted the latter to “do something big.”
120
 U.S. intelligence interpreted this 
threat as a danger to U.S. interests in the region and took the unprecedented step of 
closing 19 embassies across the Middle East and North Africa for over a week.   
The strikes revealed that the Obama administration reserves the right to loosen its 
own restrictions on when lethal force would be authorized.  In fact, a senior U.S. 
intelligence official was quoted as stating the elevated threat had “expanded the scope of 
people we could go after in Yemen,” and “Before, we couldn’t necessarily go after a 
driver for the organization; it’d have to be an operations director. Now that driver 
becomes fair game because he’s providing direct support to the plot.”
121
  Reports later 
surfaced that AQAP attempted to attack Yemen’s oil infrastructure but was foiled by 
Yemeni security forces.  The massive increase in strikes and the closure of embassies 
may seem incongruous given the lack of specificity in the intercepted intelligence, and 
their location in a region where U.S. interests are perennially under threat.  However, 
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Address to the National Defense University, Washington D.C., May 23, 2013.   
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when one understands the context of these decisions it is easy to believe that the lingering 
effects of the Benghazi attack less than a year prior influenced the actions of U.S. policy-
makers.     
Somalia 
 
An examination of the strike pattern in Somalia reveals two spikes from January 
to October 2007, and March to August 2011, separated by a three-year trough during 
which the U.S. launched virtually no strikes at all (See fig 5.5).  This strike pattern is the 
result of the U.S.’s prior experience in Somalia, the status of that country as a relative 
backwater in the war on terrorism, and the variable availability of bases from which to 
launch strikes.  
 
Figure 5.5. U.S. Strikes in Somalia 2007-2013 




U.S. Involvement in Somalia: 1993-2006 
 
As with all things Somalia, the inevitable starting point is Mogadishu on Sunday, 
October 3, 1993.  Late that afternoon 120 members of the U.S. Army’s elite Rangers and 
Delta Force fast-roped into a busy market neighborhood of Mogadishu intent on 
capturing key lieutenants of Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aidid.  What followed is 
known in Somalia as Ma’alinti Rangers, or “Day of the Rangers.”  In the U.S. it is known 
simply as Black Hawk Down.  While this battle is one of the most highly documented 
and analyzed in U.S. military history, the key takeaways for our purposes are as follows:  
18 U.S. Soldiers were killed, 73 were wounded, and one was taken captive.  Video 
footage of deceased U.S. servicemen being dragged through the streets by an angry mob 
played on a loop on every major news outlet in the world.  The day after the failed raid, 
President Bill Clinton canceled the U.S. involvement in the hunt for Aidid, and ordered a 
full withdrawal of all U.S. troops by March, 1994.
122
   
The withdrawal marked the end of the U.S. involvement in the horn of Africa 
until the attacks of September 11, 2001.  At the time of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. 
suspected that Al-Qaeda operated in some capacity within Somalia as it continued to 
investigate the attacks against U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 
1998.  Somalia certainly represented the epitome of the kind of failed state that Al-Qaeda 
would use as a sanctuary from western reprisals, and there were allegations that Al-Qaeda 
was planning to relocate its base of operations there after losing Afghanistan.  In 
December 2001, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that “Somalia has 
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been a place that has harbored al-Qaeda and, to my knowledge, still is.”
123
 However, as a 
result of its complete disengagement from the region in the 1990’s, the U.S. had little to 
no ground intelligence on the structure of Al-Qaeda’s operations there.
124
    
With little intelligence to go on, the U.S. increased the number of ships and 
surveillance aircraft patrolling the waters and skies of Somalia and sent approximately 
100 Special Forces soldiers back into the country.  In January 2002, the Bush 
administration nearly authorized lethal action against several individuals thought to be 
Al-Qaeda associates, but subsequent investigation by Special Forces operators were 
unable to find any tangible link.
 125
  When Ras Komboni, a camp at the southern tip of the 
country and thought to be a major terrorist training facility was found abandoned, the 
U.S. shifted its focus.
126
 
After finding no quickly-actionable targets in Somalia, the U.S. switched tactics 
towards building the security capacity of regional allies.  In 2002 the U.S. established the 
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.   
At the time of its inception, the 500 Special Forces troops stationed there were 
responsible for both surveillance operations over Somalia and regional training 
requirements associated with the 2003 East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) 
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aimed at improving border security.
127
  The two countries that benefited most from this 
multi-billion dollar windfall, Ethiopia and Kenya would later feature prominently in our 
Somalia sequence.
128
   
From 2003 until 2006, the U.S. adopted a policy of paying Somali warlords like 
Mohammed Afrah Qanyare, Bashir Raghe, Mohamed Nur Galal, and Ahmed Hili’ow 
Addow to track, detain, and occasionally kill key individuals suspected of being Al-
Qaeda operatives.
129
  The CIA also provided warlords on its payroll with detailed 
targeting packages on high-profile terrorists like Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, one of the 
alleged masterminds of the 1998 embassy bombings and Saleh Ali Saleh al-Nabhani, 
suspected in the 2002 Paradise Hotel bombing.  Although this tactic failed to produce 
either Fazul or Nabhani, it did create a strong incentive for warlords to profile and kidnap 
anyone who they thought could possibly have radical Islamist sympathies.  This tactic 
resulted in the brazen capture and rendition of Mohammed Ali Isse in late 2003 from his 
safe-house in Mogadishu.  A minor Islamic radical wanted for masterminding the killings 
of four foreign aid workers, Isse was captured by the warlord Qanyare
130
 and rendered to 
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a U.S. warship where he received medical treatment for wounds sustained during his 
capture and was continually interrogated during his recovery.  From the warship, Isse was 
transported to Camp Lemonier, Djibouti and ultimately rendered to Ethiopia where he 
was subjected to torture
131
 and further interrogation before ultimately being returned to 
Somali authorities who sentenced him to life in Berbera prison.  The tactic of supporting 
and relying on warlords for such missions yielded little in the way of actionable 
intelligence to the U.S., and ended up serving as a boon to Islamic extremists in the 
country.  In 2004, the two senior foreign Al-Qaeda figures in the country Fazul and 
Nabhani developed a partnership with Al-Shabab founder Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, who 
allegedly received training at Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, 
the military commander of Al Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI).  Through Aweys, Al-Shabab 
and Al-Qaeda influence were able to enter into an alliance with the emerging anti-
warlord uprising formally known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).   
The ICU began in 2000 as a response to the pervasive lawlessness that dominated 
the power vacuum which followed the collapse of the AIAI by Ethiopia in 1997.  Initially 
an unconnected system of 11 autonomous courts which implemented Shariah law at the 
clan level, the ICU unified in 2004 in order to enforce judgments across clan lines.  
Sheikh Dahir Aweys, (the former leader of AIAI) and Sheik Ali Dheere led the Shariah 
Implementation Council which was responsible for uniting the courts under Islamic 
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  However, a relative moderate Sharif Sheik Ahmed was named the consolidated 
organization’s leader.  Under Sharif’s leadership the ICU gained popular local support for 
its pan-Somali rhetoric and its ability to provide a sense of security and justice.  By 2005 
the ICU was in direct conflict with the U.S.-backed warlords and by extension the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
133
  Bolstered by arms shipments from Eritrea, 
the ICU declared war on the warlords in February 2006.  In response Qanyare and other 
warlords on the U.S. payroll announced the creation of the Alliance for the Restoration of 
Peace and Counterterrorism in order to provide a united resistance to the ICU.  In March 
2006, the U.S. officially endorsed the warlords with a statement by State Department 
spokesman Sean McCormack that the U.S. strategy was to “work with responsible 
individuals... in fighting terror. It’s a real concern of ours—terror taking root in the Horn 
of Africa. We don’t want to see another safe haven for terrorists created. Our interest is 
purely in seeing Somalia achieve a better day.”
134
 This endorsement would prove to be 
ill-fated.    
On the coattails of this statement the ICU began its campaign to drive the 
warlords out of Mogadishu.  To the dismay of U.S. policy-makers, the ICU enjoyed a 
groundswell of popular support from a civilian population tired of the warlord’s 
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ineffective and violent rule.
135
  By June, 2006 the warlords were defeated and the ICU 
was consolidating its control of Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia.  Sharif Sheik Ahmed 
immediately reached out to the international community for recognition of the new 
Somali government and denied that the ICU had any connection to terrorists.  Citing the 
ICU’s alliance with Harakat al-Shabab against the warlords as clear evidence that the 
ICU was at best neutral on the subject of Al-Qaeda and at worst tacitly supportive of the 
group and its goals, the U.S. opposed the ICU and continued its support of the 
Transitional Federal Government in exile.  Rebuffed by the west, Sharif’s attempts at 
engagement also cost him credibility with the extremist elements within the ICU and he 
was demoted and replaced by the hardline Aweys.  Sharif’s demotion seemed to confirm 
the U.S.’s concerns, and it turned to its regional partners Ethiopia and Kenya.   
 
Somalia Spike I:  January to October 2007 
 
With a long history of animosity in mind, Ethiopia was keenly interested in the re-
installation of the TFG Somalia as a weak but pliant satellite government.  By November 
2006, Ethiopia had massed troops on the Somali border and on December 24, 2006 it 
invaded.  Although publicly denied, several sources including Ali Mohammed Ghedi, the 
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prime minister of the TFG, admit that the U.S. backed the invasion with logistical, 
intelligence, and air support.
136
   
The Ethiopian invasion and subsequent occupation marks the high-water mark of 
lethal U.S. strikes in Somalia.  From January to October 2007 the U.S. launched seven 
lethal strikes using AC-130 gunships all aimed at killing key players in the Al-Qaeda/Al-
Shabab/ICU nexus. The first strike on January 7, 2007 targeted Al-Shabab leader Aden 
Hashi Farah Ayro who was wounded but ultimately escaped.  At least two of the strikes 
targeted embassy bombing mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed but succeeded only 
in killing his companions.  Another strike aimed at ICU military commander Ahmed 
Madobe ended when he was wounded and detained.
137
  Finally two additional U.S. 
strikes killed Al-Qaeda figures Abdullah Sudi Arale, a courier, and Abu Talha al-Sudani, 
the financier of the 1998 embassy bombings.   
Three-Year Trough: 2008 to 2010 
 
The strikes ended in November 2007 when the Ethiopian government suspended 
U.S. access to its airbase in response to reports from February of that year that the U.S. 
was using Ethiopian infrastructure and air corridors to launch the strikes.  The loss of the 
use of the Ethiopian airbase at Arba Minch severely curtailed U.S. strike capability in the 
region.  This curtailment helps to explain the targeting method used in the only two lethal 
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strikes in 2008.  Utilizing cruise missiles in both instances, the U.S. first tried 
unsuccessfully to target Saleh Nabhani on March 2 at his compound in Dobley, before 
killing the leader of Al-Shabab, Aden Hashi Farah Ayro in Dhusa Mareb.
138
  Achieving 
success using cruise missiles is much more complex than a simple airstrike.  The strike 
was on Ayro was reportedly the result of several weeks of surveillance and tracking 
which ensured that Ayro was on location and would not move for the approximately 30 
minute delay from launch to detonation.  Such intensive surveillance and intelligence 
gathering requires manpower.  At a time when military and intelligence resources were 
strained by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not surprising that the U.S. was only 
able to mount one or two such operations per year.     
At the time of Ayro’s killing or “martyrdom,” Al-Shabab had grown beyond the 
point of being seriously damaged by his death.  The new head of the U.S. and Ethiopian 
backed TFG was none other than Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the former “moderate” head of 
the ICU who had negotiated safe passage out of Somalia in the early days of the 
Ethiopian invasion.  The splintering within the former ICU caused by Sharif’s defection 
to the TFG allowed Al-Shabab to gain a great deal of influence and credibility with 
groups opposed to the Ethiopian occupation.  Al-Shabab seized the opportunity and 
waged a punitive insurgency against the Ethiopian occupation force using manpower, 
technical expertise, and tactical know-how imported by the group’s Al-Qaeda liaisons, 
Fazul and Nabhani.  
Recognizing in Al-Shabab the Al-Qaeda connection it had long dreaded in 
Somalia, the U.S. focused all available intelligence assets in the horn of Africa on the 
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tracking and surveillance of Fazul and Nabhani.  In May 2009, shortly after the Obama 
administration assumed power, an opportunity to lethally target Nabhani arrived.  After a 
lengthy debate over whether to kill or capture Nabhani, a lethal raid using helicopter 
gunships launched from ships off the coast of Somalia killing Nabhani.  Special 
operations forces then landed to collect his body for DNA identification.
139
  The raid was 
the first lethal strike in Somalia under the Obama administration.  After the death of 
Nabhani, Fazul consolidated control of Al-Qaeda’s operations in Somalia and continued 
to work alongside Al-Shabab in its fight against the TFG and the new peacekeeping force 
known as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) headed by Uganda and 
Burundi.  In retaliation for the attack on Nahban, Al-Shabab carried out a complex 
suicide bombing on AMISOM’s headquarters in Mogadishu which killed over 20 
members of AMISOM including its deputy commander.  While the U.S. would not 
launch another lethal strike in Somalia until 2011, it continued to build capacity in the 
region; arming and equipping regional partners Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti while 
expanding Camp Lemonier and opening new UAV-capable airfields in southern Ethiopia 
and the Seychelles.      
 
Somalia Spike II: March to August 2011 
 
From the perspective of tracking lethal strikes, 2011 was a complicated year.  
While there were only two confirmed U.S. strikes, the total is likely closer to ten; 
marking a significant spike in our sequence. Again, a look at context can assist us in the 
process of making an educated guess.  In April 2011 a battle took place between Al-
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Shabab and Somali security forces in the town of Dhobley.  The battle ended with an 
airstrike on al-Shabab positions which killed a regional commander Jabreel Malik 
Muhammed.  June 23, 2011 marks the first known use of a UAV to launch a lethal strike 
in Somalia. The strike’s location in Kismayo, at the far southern tip of Somalia is 
telling.
140
  With a direct line distance of over 850 miles from Camp Lemonier, Kismayo 
is beyond the 500-mile flight radius of the Predator UAV and is pushing the upper limits 
of the more capable Reaper.  However, we also know from our analysis of bases that the 
U.S. regained access to its airbase at Arba Minch in mid to late 2011.  Using Arba Minch 
as a launching point opens up southern Somalia to both Predator and Reaper variants, 
making it much more feasible to serve as the base of choice for the kind of 24-hr 
surveillance coverage needed when undertaking lethal UAV strike operations.  Of the 
remaining eight suspected strikes in 2011, all were located in the far-southern region of 
Somalia where forces of the Somali TFG backed by AMISOM were pushing into 
territory controlled by al-Shabab.  In addition, a look at what was going on in Yemen and 
Pakistan during the same time period, reveals a significant increase in strikes in Yemen 
and the second deadliest year on record in Pakistan.  This data, coupled with John 
Brennan’s May 1, 2012 speech defending the practice and ethics of targeted killing, 
which highlighted recent success in the region only increases the likelihood of such a 
significant increase in Somalia being true.  In this case, using our knowledge of context 
allows for an educated guess: namely, that the majority of the suspected U.S. strikes in 
                                                          
140
 Also in June, 2011 another significant blow to Al-Qaeda in eastern Africa took place with the killing of 
1998 Embassy bombing mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed.  Traveling with a fake South African 
passport identifying him as Daniel Robinson, Fazul was killed by Somali security forces at a security 
checkpoint in Mogadishu when he failed to comply with the instructions of the guards.  A detailed account 
of the incident can be found in the Jeremy Scahill book Dirty Wars.  
74 
 
2011 were actual U.S. strikes marking a massive escalation of lethal targeting in that 
country. 
 
Al-Shabab Pledges Allegiance to Al-Qaeda 
 
In October 2011, at the same time the U.S. was increasing the intensity of its 
lethal strike campaign, Kenya sent 2,000 troops, (interestingly a force equivalent in size 
to the three counter-terrorism battalions trained and equipped by the U.S. beginning in 
2007) into southern Somalia with the mission of destroying Al-Shabab in the region in 
order to prevent the spread of the conflict into Kenyan territory.  The resulting occupation 
of southern Somalia would add a degree of murkiness to future airstrikes as the Kenyan 
air force launched multiple unilateral strikes in 2012 in support of ground operations.   
In February 2012, Ahmed Abdi Godane, the leader of Al-Shabab confirmed what 
U.S. intelligence already knew and formally pledged Al-Shabab to Al-Qaeda.  In a video 
statement to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri Godane states: 
O our beloved Emir, on behalf of my brothers in al Shabaab al Mujahideen 
Movement, commanders and soldiers, I say: We give allegiance to you to follow 
the Book of Allah and the Sunnah [traditions] of His Messenger, to listen and 
obey in good and bad, to have altruism and not dispute with people in their fields 
except when we see clear unbelief that is proven in the revelation from Allah as 




 In response to the formal joining of the two groups, the U.S. continued its campaign 
launching two lethal strikes in early 2012, both targeting Al-Shabab leaders.  2012 also 
marked a continuation of the Kenyan occupation of southern Somalia and the hand-over 
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of power from the TFG and Sharif Sheikh Ahmed to the Federal Government of Somalia 
presided over by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.   
On September 21, 2013 a group of Al-Shabab militants attacked the Westgate 
shopping center in Nairobi, Kenya.  The attack and subsequent siege lasted nearly four 
days and killed 67 people.
142
  The attacks were a response to Kenya’s 2011 incursion into 
the Kismayo region, and a reminder that Al-Shabab still possessed the capability to strike 
outside the borders of Somalia.  On October 5, 2013, U.S. special operations forces 
launched a ground raid in Barawe Somalia targeted at capturing Abdulkadir Mohamed, 
the lead planner of the mall attack.  The attack failed to capture Abdulkadir, but did result 
in the death of two senior Al-Shabab members Abdi Qadar and Awab al-Uquba.
143
  The 
only confirmed lethal drone strike by the U.S. in 2013 occurred on October 28 when 
senior Al-Shabab figure Ibrahim ali Abdi, and leading bomb-maker was killed while 
traveling by vehicle to Barawe.
144
 
Finally, on January 26, 2014 the U.S. again targeted Al-Shabab leader Ahmed 
Abdi Godane, but succeeded instead in killing Godane’s close friend Sahal Iskudhuq, a 
leader within Al-Shabab’s intelligence unit Amniyat.
145
  The attack marks the latest U.S. 
strike in Somalia, but will by no means be the last.  Unless the U.S. changes a strategy 
developed over the last six years, and shifts tactical responsibility for Somalia away from 
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JSOC to the CIA, we are unlikely to see the mass strikes and casualties associated with 
the CIA’s “signature” strikes in Pakistan and Yemen.  Rather, given our understanding of 
the sequencing of Somalia, we should expect to see a pattern of 1 to 2 strikes per year on 
senior Al-Shabab/Al-Qaeda figures.  As shown, this pattern may be interspersed by an 
occasional spike should Al-Shabab make significant progress in its fight against the 
Somali Federal Government or one of the U.S.’s regional partners.  Thus, it is likely that 
U.S. operations in Somalia will always be a kind of “also-ran” operation in the 








We bring the Islamic Ummah the glad tidings of the martyrdom of the Commander 
Sheikh Abu Yusif Salih Ali Salih al-Nabhani, alongside a group of his brothers.  This 
took place late Monday morning, the 24th of Ramadhan 1430.  A crusader war plane with 
assistance from the military fleets off the coast of Muslim Somalia targeted the 
Commander Sheikh Salih Ali Salih al-Nabhani, also known as Abu Yusif, as well as 
some of his companions - may Allâh have mercy on them - as they were traveling 





 After reviewing existing arguments on the underlying causes of the increase in 
lethal targeting, and searching for greater depth and precision at the macro-level, it is 
useful to examine the same issue at the micro-level.  Specifically, let us examine the 
cases of three individuals, Saeed al-Shihri, Saleh ali-Nabhani, and Anas al-Libi.  All three 
individuals are or were self-avowed members of Al-Qaeda, and they have all planned or 
perpetrated terrorist attacks against the U.S. or its citizens abroad.
147
  However, the U.S. 
response to each of these individuals reveals much about the variable nature of U.S. 
counter-terrorism efforts across time and space.  One received political asylum in the 
west while being a member of a known Islamist fighting group; another spent six years in 
Guantanamo, while the third was lethally targeted by two presidents.  Today two are 
dead, killed in lethal U.S. strikes, and the third is awaiting a civilian trial in the U.S.   
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 Nabhani and al-Libi are both named in the U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden et al indictment dated November 
1998 for the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.   
78 
 
We will use these cases to further examine Klaidman’s theory that the increase in 
lethal strikes comes as a result of a lack of detainment options, or if the U.S. response to 
these individuals can be explained by the interaction of UAV availability, the evolving 
legal approach to terror suspects, and the impact of events in time and space.  
 
Case Study No. 1:  Saeed Al-Shihri (AKA: Abu Sufyan al-Azdi) 
 
Saeed Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al-Shihri born 21 September, 1973 in Riyadh Saudi 
Arabia did not complete high-school.  In 1991 Shihri volunteered for the Saudi Arabian 
Internal Security Force and rose to the rank of First Lieutenant prior to being removed by 
the Mabahith.
148149
  It appears that Shihri may have then worked at a furniture store in 
Riyadh until he travelled to Afghanistan in 2000 where he may have begun his 
association with the Al-Qaeda-associated NGO al-Wafa.  In 2001 he is identified on an 
Al-Qaeda training document under the admitted alias Salah al-Deen as having attended a 
jihadist urban warfare training session at the so-called “Libyan Camp” located north of 
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Kabul in 2001.  In addition, Shihri admitted to providing material support and advice to 
additional jihadists interested in travelling to Afghanistan via Iran during the same time 
period.
150
  It is assessed that Shihri was wounded in a U.S. airstrike near Kundoz 
Afghanistan in December 2001 and was transported to Quetta, Pakistan for medical care.  
In late January 2002, while still receiving medical care, Pakistani authorities identified 
Shihri as a member of Al-Qaeda and rendered him into U.S. custody and transport to 
detention in Guantanamo.   
While in detention at Guantanamo, Shihri was interrogated multiple times in order 
to gain intelligence on AQ recruitment in Saudi Arabia, AQ travel facilitation through 
Iran, AQ and Al-Wafa cooperation, and the potential for ties between the Saudi Red 
Crescent and terrorist organizations.  His detention was reviewed annually between 2004 
and 2007 under the auspices of the DOD’s Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
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In November 2007, despite strong circumstantial evidence that Shihri was an 
active member of Al-Qaeda and over the recommendation for continued detention by the 
Guantanamo Task Force Commander, Shihri was released to the Saudi Arabian 
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 Initially the Bush Administration asserted that is could withhold the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions from the captives of the War on Terror.  However, the Supreme Court rulings in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld and Rasul v. Bush forced the administration to acknowledge the need for a competent tribunal to 
determine the status of the detainees.  In response the DOD initiated the Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(CRST) which reviewed the status of every detainee in Guantanamo on a yearly basis.  Critics of the CRST 
process argued that the minimal legal protections offered to the defendants made them untenable as a basis 
for continued long-term detention.  Shihri had three such reviews prior to his release in November 2007.  
On June 12, 2008 the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees were 
entitled access to the U.S. justice system, with the majority opinion stating that the CRSTs were 
“inadequate.”    
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 In 2008, Shihri fled Saudi Arabia and remained under the radar until he surfaced 
in a 2009 in an online video released by AQAP’s media outlet Al-Malahim Media 
Foundation entitled “From Here We Begin and at Al-Aqsa We Meet.”
154
  The video 
featuring the new AQAP leadership included the group’s Amir Abu Basir Nasir al-
Wuhayshi, and identified Shihri as his deputy.
155
  The subsequent increase in violent 
activity by AQAP brought the organization to the forefront of the consciousness of the 
U.S. security community.  On December 25, 2009, 23-year old Nigerian Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab attempted to bring-down Northwest Airlines Flight 253 with a bomb 
concealed in his underwear.  At the time the bombing attempt was tied to the senior 
AQAP figure Anwar Al-Awlaki, but it later became clear that Shihri was key to the 
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 Named after the Saudi interior minister, Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, the Saudi jihadi-takfiri rehab 
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 According to author Mark Hamm, it was Shihri’s detention in Guantanamo and subsequent time in the 
Saudi rehabilitation program that radicalized him.  However, this conclusion is derived from an intelligence 
report citing a family interview attributing Shihri’s radicalization to his detention in Guantanamo, (p. ix).  
In addition Hamm cherry-picks information from Shihri’s CRST memo dated June 5, 2007 which lists 
several factors that favor Shihri’s release including his repeated denial of any involvement in terrorist 
activity and states that he was released because no ties to terrorism could be found.  However, the same 
memo also lists several reasons for continuing his detention.   Hamm, Mark S. The Spectacular Few : 
Prisoner Radicalization and the Evolving Terrorist Threat. New York: NYU Press, 2013. 
http://orbis.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1126719  (accessed March 03, 2014)    
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 His official title was “Secretary General of the Al-Qaeda Organization in Saudi Arabia.”  Hamm also 
claims that Shihri played a role in the September 2008 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Sana, Yemen as 




planning of the operation.
156
  On October 29, 2010 two packages with bomb material 
hidden in toner-cartridges were found on separate UPS flights bound from Yemen to the 
U.S.  AQAP quickly claimed responsibility for the attempted bombings and for the crash 
of UPS Airlines Flight 6.
157
  Through the first half of 2011, instability related to the Arab 
Spring provided an opportunity for AQAP to take control of large areas of southern 
Yemen.  The Obama administration, increasingly alarmed by the potential rise of another 
safe-haven for Al-Qaeda, responded by launching nearly 20 lethal strikes between May 
and December of that year including the September 30, 2011 strike that killed Al-Awlaki 
and fellow American Samir Khan.  In 2012, the Yemeni government launched an 
offensive to regain ground lost to AQAP.  American UAVs provided close air support for 
the operation and the number of lethal strikes carried-out by U.S. forces increased 
dramatically to well over 70 in 2012 alone.  In September 2012 Yemeni officials 
announced that Shihri had been killed in a U.S. airstrike.  However, in an October, 22, 
2012 audio recording, Shihri denounced the report of his death.  He was subsequently 
wounded, (this time mortally) in a U.S. strike on October 28, 2012.  Shihri is said to have 
died of his wounds on or about January 24, 2013.
158
   
 The case of Saeed Al-Shihri is interesting in that it spans almost the entire “war 
on terror,” and two administrations.  The U.S. response to Shihri included everything 
from extrajudicial detention to rehabilitation, before finally ending with lethal targeting.      
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 It is a good bet to assume that information gleaned from Shihri’s audio recording played a role in his 





Evaluation vs. Klaidman 
 
First we must evaluate whether Shihri’s lethal targeting came as a result of the 
lack of viable detention options after the closure of Guantanamo as suggested by 
Klaidman.  On the surface there does seem to be some evidence to support this argument.  
After-all, Shihri was detained in Guantanamo for six years.  Would it not follow that 
upon his recidivism to terrorist activities he would be returned there if such an option still 
existed?  However, making this argument ignores a key factor:  there were viable 
detention options for Shihri at the time of his death.  After Shihri’s own admission of his 
involvement in the Christmas day and UPS bombing plots, he could have been indicted, 
captured, and faced civilian trial in the U.S.  Additionally, Shihri could have faced 
civilian trial and detention in either Yemen or his home nation Saudi Arabia.  Why then 
was he killed instead?   
 
Evaluation vs. Thesis 
 
Let us turn to an evaluation of his targeted killing within the context of UAV 
availability, legal status, and event context.  As Shihri was detained from 2002 to 2008, it 
does not make sense to evaluate whether the lack of birds and bases prior to 2008 
prevented his lethal targeting during that period.  However, by 2013, the U.S. had well 
over 50 UAV Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) in theater and multiple redundancies in bases 
from which to launch them.  In addition, his role as the deputy commander of AQAP 
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certainly qualified him as an imminent and continuing threat to the U.S. under the 
standards laid out in the president’s May, 2013 speech.  
 It is also important to emphasize the contextual background of the 2013 strike.  
At the time of his capture in 2002, Shihri was a relative bit-player for Al-Qaeda.  Had he 
died in the tactical airstrike that wounded him in late 2001 it would not have registered 
with U.S. intelligence as significant.
159
  Interrogations during his subsequent detention in 
Guantanamo corroborated his relative low-importance which eventually led to his release 
to the Saudi rehabilitation program.   
The general lack of interest in locating Shihri after his disappearance from the 
rehab program only serves to emphasize his relative unimportance at this point.  It was 
where he went, and what he did after leaving rehab that ultimately led to his being 
lethally targeted.  By parlaying his Guantanamo street-cred into a senior-leader position 
within AQAP in 2009, Shihri jumped back into the consciousness of the U.S. counter-
terrorism community.   Shihri’s subsequent participation in the planning and nearly 
successful execution of two bombing plots against U.S. aircraft made him one of several 
AQAP leaders who were considered nearly on-par with the core AQ leadership operating 
in Pakistan at the time.  
 Shihri’s location in Yemen was also a problem.  The Yemeni government’s 
tenuous grasp on power then and now precluded the option of bringing Shihri to justice 
within civilian courts in either Yemen or the United States.  Between 2003 and 2014 
there were four major prison breaks in Yemen which freed nearly 200 convicted Al-
Qaeda fighters.  Included within this number are individuals like Jamel Ahmed 
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engaged in battle with U.S. Special Operations Forces.    
84 
 
Mohammed Ali Al-Badawi, a key conspirator in the October, 2000 bombing of the 
U.S.S. Cole.  Al-Badawi was captured by Yemeni authorities in the immediate aftermath 
of the bombing and was sentenced to 15 years in prison.  In April 2003 Al-Badawi 
escaped with 10 others including U.S.S. Cole co-conspirator Fahd Mohammed Ahmed al-
Quso.  He was recaptured later that year and sentenced to death in 2004.  However, in 
February 2006 Al-Badawi was one of 23 Al-Qaeda fighters who escaped Sana’a prison 
through a 300 meter underground tunnel beneath the Al-Awkaf Mosque.  In 2007 Al-
Badawi surrendered to the Yemeni authorities, and despite an existing $5 million reward 
offered by the U.S. department of Justice, was given a full pardon in exchange for a 
pledge to renounce terrorist activities.   
Given this history, the U.S. had(s) little confidence in the ability of the Yemeni 
criminal justice system to enforce appropriate anti-terrorism measures.    In addition, the 
Yemeni regime has allied itself with the U.S. in the war on terror, a position that is deeply 
unpopular with the majority of its population.  Yemen’s status as the base of operations 
for AQAP made it imperative that the U.S. not engage in operations that exacerbated the 
fragility of the Yemeni government.  While the Yemeni government routinely takes 
credit for U.S. airstrikes within its borders,
160
 it would be hard-pressed to explain away 
the presence of U.S. ground forces conducting raids to capture individuals like Shihri and 
Badawi.  Shihri’s death is a prime example of the confluence of UAV availability, a 
permissive legal environment, and context.  Shihri’s previous detention in Guantanamo, 
his increasing international profile, coupled with a history of ineffectiveness by the 
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Yemeni government to maintain civilian detention, and reticence by U.S. to jeopardize a 
key ally in the war on terror ultimately led to Shihri being lethally targeted.   
 
Case Study No. 2:  Saleh Ali Saleh al-Nabhani 
 
Saleh Ali Saleh al-Nabhani was born April 4, 1979 in Mombasa Kenya.  
According to the BBC Nabhani grew up within the city’s Majengo slum amongst other 
Swahili Arabs.  In the late 1980’s he dropped out of secondary school and began 
attending a local Madrasa.  From there Nabhani is believed to have moved to the Middle 
East before returning to Mombasa in the late 1990’s where his mother states that he sold 
fruit juice and cell phone accessories for a living.  In early 2002 Nabhani abruptly left his 
family, leaving behind a nine-month-old daughter.  In November 2002 Nabhani assisted 
in the execution of simultaneous attacks in Mombasa against the Israeli-owned Paradise 
Resort Hotel killing 15, and for the attempted shoot down of an Arkia Israel 
Airliner.
161162
  Later linked to the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Tanzania 
which killed more than 200 people,
163
 Nabhani first came to the attention of CIA agents 
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 Nabhani’s connection to the 1998 embassy attacks is minimal.  Several reports came out following the 
Bush administration’s attempt to target Nabhani with cruise missiles in 2008 that linked Nabhani to the 
attacks.   
(2008, March 4). U.S. strike kills terrorist, The Washington Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/mar/4/us-strike-kills-terrorist/?page=all   However, Nabhani 
is not named in the indictment.  At best, Nabhani’s possible association with AQ member Fazul 
Mohammed who was indicted for the attacks serves as the linkage.  Starr, B. (2008, March 3). Official: 




cooperating with Somali warlords in 2004.  At the time, Nabhani and Al-Qaeda co-
conspirator Fazul Abdullah Mohammed are said to have developed a partnership with Al-
Shabab founder Aden Hashi Farah Ayro, who allegedly received training at Al-Qaeda 
camps in Afghanistan, and Hassan Dahir Aweys, the military commander of Al Itihaad 
al-Islamiya (AIAI).  In February 2006 the FBI identified him as a person of interest after 
it was discovered that he owned the vehicle used in the bombing of the Paradise Hotel.  
During the 2006 ICU uprising against the U.S.-backed warlords Nabhani remained in 
Somalia where it is likely that he served as a commander within Harakat al-Shabab’s 
military wing known as Jaysh al-‘Usrah, or “Army of Hardship.”   
In March 2008, the Bush Administration attempted to kill Nabhani when it fired 
two cruise missiles at his residence in Dobley Somalia.
164
  The strike failed to kill 
Nabhani and instead killed nearly two-dozen civilians, outraging local Somalis who 
considered the strike an act of war.   On September 14, 2009 the president, after being 
briefed on an opportunity to target Nabhani, ordered that he should be killed by a manned 
U.S. strike team.
 
 His generals informed him that such a mission could potentially violate 
U.S. adherence to international humanitarian law or the laws of land warfare which 
dictate that after an enemy combatant has been rendered defenseless, he or she is 
considered a prisoner of war and must be rendered first aid and accorded food, shelter, 
and protection.
 
 The general’s concerns were noted, and the raid went ahead as directed 
killing Nabhani and several other members of the Harakat al-Shabab network.
165
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 Nabhani’s official “martyrdom” statement released by Harakat al-Shabab on September 15, 2009 
describes the events as follows:  “We bring the Islamic Ummah the glad tidings of the martyrdom of the 
Commander Sheikh Abu Yusif Salih Ali Salih al-Nabhani, alongside a group of his brothers.  This took 
87 
 
Evaluation vs. Klaidman 
 
Klaidman leans heavily on the 2009 raid by U.S. Special Forces to kill Saleh Ali 
Nabhani as evidence that due to the executive order to close Guantanamo, the Obama 
Administration was less interested in capturing terrorists for which it had no legal 
recourse and instead preferred that they be lethally targeted.  However, he fails to explain 
why Nabhani was lethally targeted prior to Obama’s executive order to close 
Guantanamo.  As evidenced by the Bush administration’s 2008 strike attempt, Obama’s 
decision to lethally target Nabhani was more of a continuation of Bush-era policies than a 
departure from them.     
Evaluation vs. Thesis  
 
 While the lethal targeting of Saleh Nabhani does not support Klaidman’s theory 
that Obama was lethally targeting a terrorist who would have previously been subject to 
capture, neither is it perfectly explained by this thesis.  It is interesting for example that 
the U.S. targeted Nabhani twice in 2008 and 2009, despite the lack of available UAV 
coverage in southern Somalia prior to the re-opening of the Arba Minch airbase in 2011.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
place late Monday morning, the 24th of Ramadhan 1430, corresponding to September 14, 2009.  A 
crusader war plane with assistance from the military fleets off the coast of Muslim Somalia targeted the 
Commander Sheikh Salih Ali Salih al-Nabhani, also known as Abu Yusif, as well as some of his 
companions - may Allâh have mercy on them - as they were traveling through areas of the Islamic Region 
of Lower Shabelle. The crusader enemies hovered and then raided the car that was carrying the 
Commander Abu Yusif and his brothers - may Allâh accept them.  Six helicopters participated in the attack, 
which began with heavy shooting in a focused manner, targeting the brothers' car.  Two of the helicopters 
then began a quick descent thinking that they had subdued the brothers.  But the Lions, despite their small 
numbers and their simple weapons, were able - by the grace of Allah - to respond to the enemy and resist 
them. The engagement there lasted for nearly one hour, until the four other planes intervened to reinforce 
the first batch of the enemy. It was by the will of Allâh that the Commander Sheikh Abu Yusif became a 
martyr with a group of his companions. The enemy rushed to the scene to seize the bodies of the brothers, 
and we do not yet know the extent of the losses suffered by the enemy during the confrontation.”  
Anzalone, C. (2009, September 16).  Somalia’s Harakat Harakat al-Shabab Announce the ‘Martyrdom’ of 
AQC Operative Ali Salah al-Nabhanii.  Retrieved from http://occident.blogspot.com/2009/09/somali-
harakat-Harakat al-Shabab-announce.html  
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As a result, the first attempt to kill Nabhani relied on cruise missiles, while the second 
utilized attack helicopters launched from a U.S. ship off-shore.   Thus, understanding the 
availability of UAVs helps to explain the method used to target Nabhani, but does little to 
explain why he was lethally killed rather than captured.  
Nabhani’s legal status has a little more to say about the reasons behind his lethal 
targeting.  Although consistently linked by journalistic accounts to the 1998 U.S. 
embassy bombings, his connection to those attacks remains vague.  A much stronger case 
can be built for his involvement in the 2002 Mombassa attacks.
166
  However, as those 
attacks were solely aimed at Israeli interests, he would likely have to have been 
extradited to Israel for trial.  For obvious reasons, the transfer of a high-profile U.S. 
terror-suspect to Israel was likely not high on either Bush or Obama’s list of options.  
Nabhani certainly met the administrations’ kill criteria of as an imminent and continuing 
threat to the U.S.  However, Nabhani’s status as a legal kill is not sufficient to explain 
why the U.S. took the actions it did.  We must therefore examine the context of the 
decision by two different presidents to kill him.   
 The reader will remember from chapter five that from 2003 until 2006, the U.S. 
espoused a policy of paying Somali warlords like Mohammed Afrah Qanyare, Bashir 
Raghe, Mohamed Nur Galal, and Ahmed Hili’ow Addow to capture suspected Al-Qaeda 
militants and render them to the CIA.  The policy failed to yield any high value targets 
like Nabhani.  The fall of the warlords to the Al-Qaeda-friendly Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU) in 2006 effectively ended the U.S. rendition program in Somalia. 
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After the rise of the ICU in 2006, the U.S. attempted to limit its direct imprint on 
Somali affairs by encouraging allies Ethiopia, Kenya, and Burundi to take the lead in 
driving-out the ICU and providing support the internationally recognized Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG).  While these interventions were successful in deposing the 
ICU, they sparked popular insurgencies led by Al-Shabab and effectively limited the 
scope of TFG control to Mogadishu until late 2011.  This lack of control meant that the 
U.S. could not rely on the TFG to capture, try, and imprison influential leaders like 
Nabhani.  As a result, U.S. actions after the fall of the ICU reveal a decreased interest in 
detention, and an increased emphasis on lethal action against the senior leadership of al-
Qaeda and al-Shabab.  
In addition to an increased emphasis on lethal targeting, Nabhani’s location in the 
al-Shabab dominated southern region of Somalia also played a role.  The region is 
notoriously difficult to penetrate, with a local population largely sympathetic to Al-
Shabab.  These difficulties were in evidence during the October 2013 U.S. Special Forces 
ground raid in Barawe which attempted to capture Abdulkadir Mohamed, the lead 
planner of the Nairobi Westgate mall attack.  After coming under heavy fire U.S. forces 
were forced to withdraw without capturing Abdulkadir.
167
  
 With context in mind, the factors influencing the U.S. decision to lethally target 
rather than capture Nabhani are as follows: 1) the catastrophic failure of a U.S. program 
utilizing warlords to detain high-priority targets, 2) the unwillingness and subsequent 
inability of successive Somali governments to capture and try high-priority targets, and 3) 
the demonstrated difficulty and danger to U.S. troops of unilateral capture operations  in 
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Southern Somalia.  Taking all of this into account, it comes as little surprise that the U.S. 
chose to lethally target Nabhani in 2008 and 2009 rather than attempt to capture him.   
 
Case Study No. 3:  Nazih Abd al Hamid al Ruqhay AKA “Anas al-Libi” 
 
Born March 30, 1964 in Tripoli, Nazih Abd al Hamid al Ruqhay, (hereafter 
referred to as Anas al-Libi) studied computer programming and systems before being 
driven-out of the country in a late 1980’s campaign by Muammar Qaddafi against Islamic 
fundamentalists who were seen as a potential rallying point for opponents of the regime.  
In 1988, al-Libi travelled to Afghanistan where he is believed to have met Osama Bin 
Laden and joined Al-Qaeda.  In 1991, al-Libi was among those who travelled with Bin 
Laden to Sudan at the invitation of the Sudanese National Islamic front.  Al-Qaeda used 
the opportunity to conduct training and economic consolidation operations.
168
  In 1993, 
al-Libi was accused of conducting video and photographic surveillance on the U.S. 
embassy in Nairobi, Kenya as a member of the Al-Qaeda conspiracy to strike the 
embassy in retaliation for the U.S. involvement in Somalia.
 169170171
  In 1994, al-Libi was 
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 In 1991, Sudan's National Islamic Front, an Islamist group that had recently gained power, invited al-
Qaeda to move operations to Sudan.
 
 For several years, al-Qaeda operated several businesses (including 
import/export, farm, and construction firms) in what might be considered a period of financial 
consolidation. The group built a major 1200-km (845-mi) highway connecting the capital 
Khartoum with Port Sudan. However, they also ran a number of camps where they trained operatives in the 
use of firearms and explosives.  In 1996, Osama bin Laden was asked to leave Sudan after the United States 
put the regime under extreme pressure to expel him, citing possible connections to the 1994 attempted 
assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak while his motorcade was in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
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 Al Libi was implicated in the plot by co-conspirator turned government witness Jamal al-Fadl.  Al-Fadl 
testified before a New York judge that Al-Libi had begun conducting "photographic surveillance of the US 
Embassy in Nairobi" in late 1993, as part of a plot to attack it, according to Jamal al-Fadl, an al-Qaeda 
member turned US government witness.  His photographs were processed in a makeshift dark room in the 
apartment of L'Houssaine Kherchtou, a Moroccan al-Qaeda fighter and once Bin Laden's pilot, al-Fadl said.  
Later, "Bin Laden looked at the picture of the American embassy and pointed to where a truck could go as 
a suicide bomber," al-Fadl told a judge. file:///C:/Users/PoliSci%20GTF/Downloads/binladen20601tt.pdf 
(Reported by John Swain, Al-Libi al-Libi, al Qaeda kingpin caught in Libya, was released by British police 
before going on the run, The Telegraphy, October 6, 2013).  
91 
 
further accused of reviewing files concerning possible terrorist attacks against U.S., 
British, French, and Israeli targets in Nairobi, Kenya.  Also in 1994, Al-Qaeda 
orchestrated an attack on the motorcade of then-Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak 
during an official visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  Al-Libi remained in Sudan until 
leaving for Great Britain in 1995 at the direction of Osama Bin Laden.  Sudan was facing 
mounting international pressure to expel al-Qaeda for the attempted assassination of 
Mubarak, and Bin Laden gave key lieutenants like al-Libi financial resources to relocate 
prior to his departure with 200 followers to Jalalabad Afghanistan.   
Upon arrival in Great Britain, al-Libi traveled to Manchester, a known base for 
the Al-Qaeda-linked Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
172
 where he requested and was 
granted asylum based on his fear of reprisal from the Qaddafi regime for his connection 
to Islamic fundamentalists.  In 1998, al-Libi was named in the indictment against Osama 
Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
173
 for the August 7, 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in 
Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania which killed 224 civilians and wounded 
more than 4,000.  In 1999 British police raided al-Libi’s Manchester apartment and 
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 A copy of the indictment can be viewed at http://cns.miis.edu/reports/pdfs/binladen/indict.pdf 
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 The reasons behind Al-Qaeda’s decision to target the embassies at this time are controversial.  The U.S.  
v. Usama Bin Laden, et al indictment lists the U.S. invasion of Somalia as the motivation for the attacks 
while others point out that the eventual date of the attack marked the 8
th
 anniversary of the U.S. military 
presence in Saudi Arabia.  In his book Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, Lawrence Wright 
argues that the justifications were largely immaterial as Bin Laden’s ultimate goal was to lure the U.S. into 
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arrested him for questioning.  However, British authorities were unable to find sufficient 
evidence to hold al-Libi and released him.
174
  An FBI task force later arrived to assist 
with evidence processing, and the joint team discovered a book later described as the 
“Manchester Manual” on al-Libi’s computer which reads like a military manual for 
members of Al-Qaeda.
175
     By the time of the discovery of the Manchester Manual, al-
Libi had fled Great Britain with his family and was placed on the FBI’s Most Wanted list 
with a $5 million reward on his head.  According to al-Libi’s son, Abdullah al-Ruqai, the 
family then travelled to Kabul, Afghanistan where they remained until the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.    
After the attacks, Ruqai claims that al-Libi attempted to flee Afghanistan through 
Iran, but that the entire family was detained by Iranian intelligence along with members 
of Bin Laden’s extended family.
176
  According to the same report, al-Libi and family 
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 Here is where things get a bit strange.  According to former MI5 agent Mark Shayler, Al-Libi was one 
of several members of the Islamic Fighting Group who received payments from MI5 to assassinate 
Muammar Gadaffi in 1996.  Shayler alleges that the plot to place a bomb under Qaddafi’s car ultimately 
failed and resulted in the death of several civilians in Sirte.  French journalists Guillaume Dasquié and 
Jean-Charles Brisard argue that British and U.S. intelligence agencies disregarded an international arrest 
warrant for Al-Libi for the killing of two German anti-terrorism experts that was issued five months before 
the embassy bombings took place.   While the British government denies Shayler’s claims about Al-Libi as 
“pure fantasy,” some of his other claims including a planted story about Gadaffi’s son running a currency 
counterfeiting operation were later proven true.  Certainly the timing of his asylum, arrest, and ultimate 
flight from the country lead to questions of competence if not possible complicity.  For further reading on 
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affair. London: Andr  Deutsch. Brisard, J.-C., & Dasqui , G. (2002).  
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 While Al-Libi and his family may very well have been in Iran at this time, Ruqai’s contention that they 
were detained and tortured by Iranian intelligence is undermined by the March, 2014 trial of Osama Bin 
Laden’s son-in-law Sulaiman Abu Ghaith.  Ghaith has admitted to living in Iran for several years following 
the attacks of the September 11, 2001.   Ruqai claims that his family was detained alongside relatives of 
Bin Laden, putting their stories at odds.  Katersky, A. (2014, March 5). Prosecutor: Osama Bin Laden’s Kin 
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were held until sometime in late 2010 when they were released and smuggled out of the 
country.  Ruqai states that al-Libi’s family returned to Tripoli in 2010 and that he 
returned in 2011 as the uprising against Qaddafi began.
177
 After the fall of the Qaddafi 
regime al-Libi’s relatives state that he lived openly in Tripoli with no ties to Al-Qaeda.  
However, an August 2012 report from the Library of Congress on Al-Qaeda in Libya 
counts al-Libi as an active facilitator between Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL) and 
jihadists in Libya.
178
   
On September 11, 2012 over 100 Islamic militants launched a series of attacks 
against the U.S. Temporary Mission Facility and CIA Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  The 
attacks took place over 8 hours and left four Americans including the U.S. Ambassador to 
Libya dead.  In August, 2013 the U.S. filed sealed criminal charges against leaders of 
Ansar al-Sharia, including former Guantanamo detainee Abu Sufian bin Qumu,
179
 Ahmed 
Abu Khattalah, and Seif Allah bin Hassine.
180
  Although al-Libi was never implicated in 
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 According to the report, “Al-Qaeda has tried to exploit the Arab Awakening in North Africa for its own 
purposes during the past year. Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL), based in Pakistan, is likely seeking to 
build a clandestine network in Libya as it pursues its strategy of reinforcing its presence in North Africa 
and the Middle East, taking advantage of the Arab Awakening that has disrupted existing counterterrorism 
capabilities. Although AQSL’s previous attempt to co-opt the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was 
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 Qumu was captured in April 2002 by Pakistani ISI before being turned-over to U.S. authorities in May.  
He was released from Guantanamo in 2007 and repatriated to Libya.  He was detained by the Qaddafi 
government before playing an active role in the 2011 overthrow.   
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the attacks, his purported role as a go-between AQSL and Islamic militant groups like 
Ansar Al-Sharia would have made him a person of great interest to U.S. intelligence 
agents attempting to establish whether there was any link between Al-Qaeda and the 
Benghazi attack.   
On October 5, 2013 al-Libi was captured by U.S. Special Forces in front of his 
home in Tripoli and spirited-away to a ship waiting off-shore.  The al-Libi raid was 
meant to the first of two in Libya, with the second planned operation to capture the 
aforementioned Khattalah.
181
  However, reaction on the ground in Tripoli was severe.  In 
fact the Libyan prime minister president Ali Zeidan was briefly kidnapped by militants in 
the immediate aftermath of the attack, and the Libyan government was forced to issue a 
strong rebuke to the U.S. calling the raid a “kidnapping.”
182
  After a week aboard a U.S. 
warship, al-Libi was transported to the Southern Court of New York City where he was 
charged for his role in the 1998 embassy bombings.
183
  He remains in custody there while 
he awaits trial after pleading not guilty to the charges against him.
184
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Evaluation vs. Klaidman 
 
 The al-Libi case is somewhat unique as it ends with the capture of a high-profile 
suspect rather than his death.  In this aspect, the al-Libi case seems to be in contradiction 
to the Klaidman supposition that such captures would no longer occur after the closure of 
Guantanamo.  However, al-Libi was already under federal indictment for the 1998 U.S. 
embassy bombings, and has been found eligible for trial in a U.S. court.  Thus, the 
administration was allowed a capture option in this case.  Interestingly, al-Libi’s post-
capture transport to a U.S. warship waiting in the Mediterranean for transport and 
interrogation exactly echoes Klaidman’s account of General “Hoss” Cartwright’s 2009 
argument for a capture option of Saleh Nabhani to president Obama.   
Evaluation vs. Thesis 
 
If Klaidman is not satisfactory to explain al-Libi’s capture, how do the theories posited 
by this thesis stand-up?  First up is UAV availability.  Is there any chance that al-Libi was 
not lethally targeted due to a lack of armed UAV coverage?  In a word: No.  As part of its 
military assistance package to NATO and rebel forces fighting the Gaddafi regime in 
2011, the U.S. deployed armed Predator drones to provide close air-support (CAS) to 
forces fighting on the ground.
185
  According to some estimates, the U.S. launched as 
many as 105 drone strikes against Gaddafi loyalist forces in 2011 alone (see fig 6.1).
186
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In addition, the Senate Intelligence Committee after-action report on Benghazi mentions 
that a U.S. drone was diverted from other intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance 
(ISR) operations elsewhere in Libya in order to provide an “eyes-on” view of actions on 
the ground.
187
  Therefore, any argument that al-Libi was captured because there wasn’t a 
UAV available to kill him is a non-starter.  Birds and Bases have nothing to do with the 
decision to capture rather than kill al-Libi.   
 
 
Figure 6.1. Five Years of Drone Strikes 
Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
 
 While the availability of UAVs did not influence the decision to capture him, al-
Libi’s status as one of the few high-profile terrorists at large and under indictment made 





 Citing a DOD timeline of its response to the attacks, the report states: “At approximately 11: 10 p.m. 
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approximately one hour  earlier by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) from another intelligence collection 
mission in eastern Libya, arrived over the Mission compound and soon after detected a roadblock several 
blocks east of the Mission facility.” U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence, Review of the Terrorist Attacks 




him an ideal candidate for capture and trial in the U.S.  However, as previous strikes have 
shown, simply being eligible for civilian trial by no means guarantees exemption from 
targeted killing.  As a supposed go-between for AQSL and Ansar al-Sharia, al-Libi also 
met the administration’s criteria as an imminent and continuing threat and a legal kill.   
Therefore, al-Libi’s legal status served as an influencing factor in his capture but is not 
sufficient to completely explain it.   
 Once again, at the individual level context is king.  Why was Al-Libi captured on 
October 7, 2013 and not killed or captured prior to that?  First, it seems clear that al-
Libi’s position as a prominent anti-Gaddafi militant gave him some protection from 
western intelligence and law-enforcement up until he was linked to the 1998 embassy 
bombings.  The strongest evidence for this is that he was granted asylum in Britain after 
spending several years in the company of Osama Bin Laden.  From the point of his flight 
in 1999 until he re-emerged in 2011, al-Libi was essentially beyond the reach of the U.S. 
first in Afghanistan, and subsequently in Iran.  From there is gets more complicated.  
Assuming that the U.S. knew of al-Libi’s return to Libya,
188
 why was he not targeted by 
one of over 100 lethal strikes that the U.S. executed during the 2011 air campaign against 
Gaddafi loyalist forces?  There are three possibilities:  First, the U.S. simply did not know 
that he had returned.  Second, at the time the U.S. was more interested in the fall of the 
Gaddafi regime and al-Libi’s utility as an anti-Gaddafi leader was useful.  Third, the U.S. 
wanted to capture al-Libi alive and would have been unable to do so in the middle of a 
civil war.  As is so often the case, the answer likely lies somewhere near the confluence 
of all three.  These reasons may explain why al-Libi remained free and alive prior to 
                                                          
188
 This is a big assumption and a bit of a stretch.  However, if western intelligence was actively monitoring 
for signs of Al-Libi, the return of his family to Tripoli would have set-off alarm bells.   
98 
 
October, 2013.  How then to explain his sudden capture?  First, al-Libi’s capture was a 
relatively low-risk operation.  U.S. intelligence was able to track al-Libi’s exact location.  
Conducting a raid at his residence in relatively tranquil Tripoli did not present the same 
level of tactical risk that an operation into the jihadist stronghold of Benghazi or southern 
Somalia would have presented.  Finally, although not expressly linked by the 
government, the timing of al-Libi’s capture in the aftermath of the Benghazi attacks 
cannot be ignored.  The fact that the al-Libi raid was originally phase one of a two-phase 
operation to capture him and Abu Khattalah, the prime suspect in the Benghazi attacks, 
strongly suggests that the administration was keen to interrogate al-Libi both.  Given al-
Libi’s suspected role as a go-between AQSL and Libyan jihadist groups like Ansar Al-
Sharia, his capture may have been seen as a potential gold-mine of intelligence 
information on the role of AQ in Libya, and its influence on groups like that which 
perpetrated the Benghazi attacks.   
Conclusions 
 
The case studies of Saeed al-Shihri, Saleh ali-Nabhani, and Anas al-Libi provide 
an interesting real-world test of both Klaidman’s theory and those posited by this thesis.  
It seems clear that Klaidman’s theory while not entirely untrue, is simply too narrow to 
serve as the explanation for why each individual terrorist is killed or captured.   In fact, it 
seems clear that any single variable taken outside of the overall context is not particularly 
useful.  UAV availability may have been an influencing factor in Shihri’s targeted killing, 
but it only explains the method of killing Nabhani, and is a non-factor in the al-Libi case.  
Al-Shihri’s legal status left open the option for capture but he was killed as a legitimate 
enemy combatant.   Nabhani’s legal status was somewhat murky but was likely less 
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important in the decision to kill him than his location in lawless southern Somalia.  
Finally, al-Libi’s legal status absolutely played into the decision to capture him, but it is 
clear that there were other influencing factors as well.   So what exactly have we learned?  
Most importantly we have learned that the decision to kill or capture a high-profile target 





WHERE WILL UAVs STRIKE NEXT & WHAT ARE THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL NORMS? 
 
It's very likely that we're going to confront more terrorists here in this country; it's very 
likely they are going to be American citizens. And if, in fact, this is an effective 




Where Will the U.S. Strike Next? 
 
The four countries where the U.S. admits to executing lethal UAV strikes, 
(Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia) represent too small a sample to make a 
statistically predictive model about the larger population of nations.  However, looking at 
the why of strikes quickly reveals a number of shared attributes between these countries.    
In each of the countries where the U.S. has employed lethal strikes the following 
conditions have existed: 1) the U.S. had multiple UAV bases within the cruising radius of 
its weapon-capable drones, 2) there were enough UAVs in the U.S. available to provide 
24-hr coverage over the country, 3) each country had an Al-Qaeda or affiliated 
insurgency placing pressure on the regime, 4) each country lacked the military capability 
to launch precision strikes on its own, and 5) each nation authorized the U.S. to launch 
lethal strikes within its territory.
190
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Given these conditions the next logical step is to evaluate where the U.S. is likely to 
launch lethal strikes in the future.  A side-by-side comparison reveals five interesting 
possibilities in Syria, the Philippines, Iraq, Mali, and Turkey (See Table 7.1). We can 
eliminate Syria as a potential recipient of U.S. air support for now, and Turkey lacks an 
Al-Qaeda-based insurgency.  The Philippines and Mali on have already authorized U.S. 
surveillance flights, but remain opposed to strikes, despite a 2006 New York Times 
report that the U.S. conducted a strike in the Philippines aimed at killing Abu Sayef 
leader Umar Patek.
191










This leaves Iraq.  Recent events in Iraq reveal it to be the most likely location for 
future U.S. strikes.  In January, 2014 al-Qaeda affiliate al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) asserted 
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Table 7.1. Current and Potential Locations for U.S. Strikes 
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its control of Fallujah.
192
  At the same time the Iraqi government formally requested 
authorization to purchase ten Scan Eagle surveillance UAVs, and 75 hellfire missiles.
193
 
Finally in May, 2014, the Iraqi government requested armed UAVs, and has indicated 
that it may be willing to allow U.S. operators in order to gain access to UAVs trike 
capability.
194
  Therefore it appears that the only thing precluding a lethal UAV campaign 
Iraq is for the Iraqi government to authorize U.S. operators to return on U.S. terms.   
What then might the pattern of strikes in Iraq look like should this occur?  First, 
we know that there would be very little lag between the initial political authorization, and 
operational readiness to launch strikes.  The U.S. already has several UAV bases within 
easy striking range of targets in Iraq, and could easily re-occupy air bases in Baghdad and 
Balad that would serve as excellent launch and recovery sites.  In addition, the U.S. 
already considers itself at war with Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), precluding any protracted 
debate over the legality of killing its members.  With these two factors accounted for, the 
only wild-card remains the context within which U.S. decision-makers will operate.   In 
this instance, context may end up being a limiting factor.  
Although AQI was one of the primary adversaries facing U.S. forces during its 
occupation of Iraq from 2004-2011, AQI’s recent activities have had little to do with the 
U.S.  Instead AQI has focused on destabilizing the Iraqi government, and facilitating 
cross-border incursions with Jabhat al-Nusra, another Sunni terrorist organization 
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fighting in the Syrian civil war.
195
  As such, the U.S. would be hard-pressed to argue that 
UAV strikes in Iraq would target only individuals who represented an imminent and 
continuing threat to the U.S.  While U.S. has shown willingness to strike targets at the 
behest of the Pakistani and Yemeni governments, it has always been within the context of 
gaining or maintaining access to prominent U.S. targets in those countries.  This would 
not be the case in Iraq.  If the U.S. decides to move forward with lethal strikes in Iraq, it 
will be a watershed moment.  Going forward it would be clear that the U.S. was willing 
to utilize UAVs to kill not only individuals who threaten its own security, but also those 
who threaten to topple governments who share U.S. security interests.     
Looking Ahead: Impact on International Norms & Potential for Change 
 
 If the U.S. expands its use of UAVs to conduct lethal strikes into countries like 
Iraq and the Philippines, it will reinforce the international norm of lethal state action 
against non-state actors already being shaped by U.S. operations in Pakistan, Yemen, and 
Somalia.  Although Israel was the first to employ the strategy of lethally targeting known 
terrorist leaders using so-called “personality strikes,” the U.S has pioneered a massive 
expansion of the practice.
196
  Key to this expansion is the employment of UAVs to target 
low-level fighters who although unknown to U.S. decision makers, are engaged in 
activities that suggest they are directly involved in a terrorist organization.  The practice 
of employing such “signature strikes” greatly increases the number of viable targets and 
consequently the aggregate body-count.  The use of signature strikes is controversial 
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particularly amongst academics and policy-makers who are concerned about the 
precedent they set and the potential for other nations to employ the tactic against either 
their own citizens or groups they deem to be terrorist organizations operating in another 
state.  
  The Obama administration is keenly aware of the long-term implications of its 
actions with the President acknowledging in 2012 that “creating a legal structure, 
processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons, is going to be a 
challenge for me and my successors for some time to come.”
197
  In seeking to accomplish 
this, the administration has little in the way of an international precedent to build upon.  
There is no international treaty that specifically regulates the development and 
subsequent employment of UAVs.  Currently the only international body tracking the 
proliferation of UAV technology is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  
As an informal non-treaty association of states, the MTCR lacks regulatory teeth and is 
not recognized by nations aggressively developing UAV technology like China, India, 
Iran, and North Korea. Lacking an international monitoring infrastructure like the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) or even an industry cooperative agreement 
like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, (NSG) the manufacture and sale of UAVs is today 
something of a free-for-all.
198
  Due to its extreme cost and physical infrastructure 
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requirements, the proliferation of nuclear technology has been relatively easy to track and 
police.  This is not the case with UAVs.  Adding complexity to the issue is the relatively 
low-cost and simplicity of developing a UAV platform capable of delivering an explosive 
payload.     
Total U.S. spending on UAVs including Research and Development Evaluation 
and Testing (RDT&E), Procurement (PROC), and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
for fiscal year 2013 (FY13) was estimated to be $2.6 billion.
199
  While not an 
insignificant amount, it represents only 3% of the $80.5 billion the U.S. Air Force spent 
on total RDT&E, PROC, and O&M in FY13 (See fig 7.1).
200
   A single Predator UAV 
costs $4.5 million.  Even when you consider the added cost of building a complete UAV 
system consisting of 4 Predators and the associated ground control station, the total is  
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 This total includes expenditures on the grossly over- budget RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance UAV.  In 
FY13 the Air Force spent roughly $890 million on 6 RQ-4’s or roughly $140.9 million per aircraft.  
Spending on the Global Hawk has triggered two Nunn-McCurdy breaches (unforeseen budget growth in 
excess of 15%) in April 2005, and April 2011.    Gertler, J. (2012, January 3).  U.S. Unmanned Aerial 
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Figure 7.1. Air Force FY13 Spending: RDT&E, PROC, O&M 




 When compared to an entry-model price tag for the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter of $188.5 million, the Predator is a bargain.
202
  Or, put another way the 
U.S. could afford to purchase nine complete predator systems with a total of 36 birds for 
the price of one F-35.  For this reason, UAVs are considered “expendable” and are not 
designed with countermeasures to prevent them being shot down.  When one considers 
that $719 million or 28% of the total FY13 UAV cost was attributable to RDT&E, it is 
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  While other nations have yet to match the payload and cruising range capabilities 
of the U.S. Reaper, there is already evidence that the technology could be employed by 
lesser powers or non-state actors to achieve the same kind of asymmetric advantages that 
plagued the U.S. occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan.
204
  The most obvious example of 
this phenomenon is the struggle by U.S. forces to respond to the threat of Improvised 
Explosive Devices, (IEDs) the insurgent’s asymmetric weapon of choice.  By 2005, U.S 
forces in Iraq were under siege, encountering over 3,000 IEDs per year which killed an 
average of 75 Soldiers per month.
205
  In response, the military launched the Joint 
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) made up of over 1,900 
military personnel and contractors with expertise in countering the IED threat.  Faced 
with a dizzying array of IED threats which were only limited by the talent and vicious 
creativity of the bomb-maker, JIEDDO applied a full-spectrum response to the problem 
including training, counter-measures, and steadily increasing the amount of armor on 
troop vehicles.  However, by 2010 the U.S. had spent over $41 billion combating IEDs 
with little to show for it.
206
  The IEDs were still accounting for nearly 60% of all U.S. 
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casualties, and aggregate decreases in troop deaths were credited to the co-option by U.S. 
forces of large portions of the Sunni-based insurgency into the “Sons of Iraq.”
207
   
U.S. struggles with asymmetric threats did not go unnoticed by the rest of the 
world.  Recognizing the asymmetric potential of UAVs, states like Iran began to develop 
and ship them to regional surrogates like Hezbollah.
208
   Using these UAVs, Hezbollah 
flew at least four flights over northern Israel between 2004 and 2006.  In 2005, the 
aircraft were revealed to be the Iranian-made surveillance UAV, the Misrad-1.
209
  Then, 
in 2006 the IDF shot-down two additional Hezbollah UAVs during the Israeli Lebanon 
war which were identified as the Iranian Ababil.
210
  The shoot-downs were impressive as 
the Ababil like most UAVs flies very low and has virtually no infrared or radar signature.  
However, these victories were only accomplished by dedicating several aircraft within 
the IAF to the interdiction mission.
211
  This is a classic example of asymmetry wherein 
the outmatched opponent forces the more powerful to dedicate crucial military and 
financial resources to combat a threat that is relatively cheap to manufacture and employ.  
The Ababil boasts amongst its capabilities, the ability to carry an 88lb explosive over a 
distance of 150 miles.  Although fears that Hezbollah could use this capability to launch 
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 Ababil is translated as “Swallow” from Farsi.  
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precision strikes or even disperse chemical/biological weapons have not been realized, its 
appearance on the battlefield is a signal that the U.S. and its allies are not the only ones 
capable of realizing relative military advantage through UAV technology.    
The problem of unwanted aircraft does not belong to Israel alone.  In 2010 a 
Mexican surveillance UAV crash landed in an El Paso residential area.
212
  As technology 
improves, costs fall, and payload capacity and cruising range increase, the U.S. will be 
forced to monitor for the possibility of a hostile air incursion, presumably by a non-state 
actor operating from anywhere within the cruising radius of the UAV in question.  Figure 
7.2 below highlights areas potentially vulnerable assuming a relatively modest cruising 
radius of 350 miles. 
 
Figure 7.2. Areas Vulnerable to UAV Threat Assuming Cruising Radius of 350 nautical 
miles 
 
Analysts are worried about the rapid proliferation of UAV technology combined 
with the precedents for its use being set by U.S. actions in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. 
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They wonder what will happen at the inevitable moment when the U.S. and its allies no 
longer have a monopoly on the application of lethal force using this platform.
213
  The 
U.S. must lay-out and follow clear self-limiting guidelines governing its use of UAVs for 
lethal purposes.  Failing this, it will lack the necessary moral authority to lead the effort 
to create the international organizations and legal regimes capable of preventing a future 
where targeted killing is employed with impunity against anyone deemed an “imminent 
threat.”
214
   As Scott Shane of the New York Times points out:    
If China, for instance, sends killer drones into Kazakhstan to hunt minority 
Uighur Muslims it accuses of plotting terrorism, what will the United States say? 
What if India uses remotely controlled craft to hit terrorism suspects in Kashmir, 
or Russia sends drones after militants in the Caucasus? American officials who 
protest will likely find their own example thrown back at them.
215
   
 
An example of the potential for this problem can be found in the Russian invasion and 
annexation of Crimea in March, 2014.  When the Obama administration condemned the 
move as a blatant violation of international law and norms, Russian president Vladimir 
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  In an interview Putin states “We are often told our actions are illegitimate, but when I ask, ‘Do you 
think everything you do is legitimate?’ they say ‘yes.’ Then, I have to recall the actions of the United States 
in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, where they either acted without any U.N. sanction or completely distorted 
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Recognizing the precariousness of the U.S. position, there is a considerable push 
amongst academics and politicians to curtail the expansiveness of the U.S. lethal 
targeting program by amending or ending the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), increasing transparency of the targeting process, and ultimately for the U.S. to 
lead the effort to establish an international treaty defining the lawful development and use 
of UAVs.
217
  In fact, in his so called “drone speech,” President Obama stated “I look 
forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and 
ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate, and I will not sign laws designed to expand this 
mandate further.”
218
 However, after nearly a year no such dialogue has occurred, and is 
not likely to.  As long as support for the practice of targeted killing remains popular or 
not likely to have a negative effect on re-election chances, the U.S. administration and 
lawmakers will have a vested interest in not limiting the reach of the AUMF.  Should 
either party take the lead in repealing or limiting the scope of the AUMF, they will make 
themselves vulnerable to voter backlash when the inevitable next terrorist attack occurs.  
Thus, the U.S. has the proverbial tiger by the tail; unable to relinquish its grip on lethal 
strikes for fear of being bitten by another terrorist attack. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the content of such resolutions, as was the case with Libya.  Americans always clearly formulate their own 
geopolitical and state interests and follow them with persistence.  Then, using the principle ‘You’re either 
with us or against us’ they draw the whole world in. And those who do not join in get beaten until they do.”   




 Beginning on page 26 of a special report for the Council on Foreign Relations, Michah Zenko succinctly 
captures the breadth of recommendations from across the academic, military, and legal communities.  
Zenko, M. (2013, January).  Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies, Council on Foreign Relations, Special 
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Coming Soon:  Lethal Strikes on U.S. Soil  
 
 While the U.S. wrestles with the idea of imposing unilateral constraints on its use 
of lethal targeting abroad, the next frontier may be very much closer to home.   During 
the 2013 confirmation hearings for John Brennan as CIA Director, Senator Rand Paul 
sent a letter to the nominee asking a number of pointed questions including the potential 
for the lethal use of UAVs against U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.
219
  Although Mr. Brennan 
responded that the CIA did not have the authority, and would not engage in the lethal 
targeting of U.S. citizens on U.S. soil, Senator Paul did receive an additional response 
from U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder.  The response denied that the administration 
had any plans to engage in domestic lethal targeting, but held the door open for future 
strikes on U.S. soil stating “It is possible, I suppose to imagine an extraordinary 
circumstance in which it would be necessary and appropriate under the Constitution and 
applicable laws of the United States for the President to authorize the military to use 
lethal force within the territory of the United States.”  While Holder’s response does not 
specifically reference the possibility of targeting U.S. citizens, an interview of former 
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales reveals that such a strike is not outside the realm 
of possibility.  Gonzales argues "It's very likely that we're going to confront more 
terrorists here in this country; it's very likely they are going to be American citizens. And 
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 The letter asked amongst other things: “Do you believe that the president has the power to authorize 
lethal force, such as a drone strike, against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil? What about the use of lethal force 
against a non-U.S. person on U.S. soil? Do you believe that the prohibition on CIA participation in 
domestic law enforcement, first established by the National Security Act of 1947, would apply to the use of 
lethal force, especially lethal force directed at an individual on a targeting list, if a U.S. citizen on a 
targeting list was found to be operating on U.S. soil? What if the individual on the targeting list was a non-
U.S. person but found to be operating on U.S. soil? Do you consider such an operation to be domestic law 
enforcement, or would it only be subject to the president’s wartime powers?” Paul, R. (2013, February 12).  









While this rhetoric seems to trample on the constitutional protection of due 
process, the real question will be how future administrations define the term imminent 
threat.  U.S. law-enforcement has always been within its rights to kill a U.S. citizen if 
there is no other way to stop that individual from harming others (i.e. an active shooter, 
terrorist with finger on the detonator, etc.).
221
  However, any lethal action taken when 
capture or containment of the threat is possible is categorized as a violation of an 
individual’s natural right to life.  If U.S. law-enforcement maintains the same stance to 
lethal force as in the past, it could be argued that a UAV is little different than a sniper 
rifle in application and end-result.  However, critics of this stance would argue that there 
is an issue of proportionality.  A UAV firing a hellfire missile into a building or moving 
vehicle greatly reduces the chances of the target surviving the strike, and violates 
international norms of proportionality and restraint in the application of deadly force.  In 
addition, the ability of UAVs to reduce the risk to law-enforcement personnel, (i.e. no 
need to send in a SWAT team) may prove to be too great a temptation for field 
commanders concerned about sending their men and women into harm’s way.  President 
Obama acknowledges this phenomenon when he states: “There’s a remoteness to it 
[ordering a drone strike] that makes it tempting to think that somehow we can, without 
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 Cohen, T. & Watkins, T. (2014, February 11).  Another U.S. citizen a potential drone target, CNN.  
Retrieved at http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/11/justice/drones----targeting-americans/  
 
221
 “Law enforcement agents may use deadly force only if they reasonably believe that killing a suspect is 
necessary to prevent him from causing immediate physical harm to the agents or to others, or to keep him 
from escaping in an area where he is likely to cause physical harm in the future.”  Idaho v. Horiuchi, 253 
.3d 359 (9
th
 Cir, 2001), vacated as moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9
th
 Cir. 2001).  
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any mess on our hands, solve vexing security problems.”
222
 Partly in anticipation of these 
fears, private industry is developing UAV variants capable of delivering less-than-lethal 
force including a man-portable UAV with a deployable Taser.  One can imagine the use 
of such a device to remotely incapacitate a belligerent without direct confrontation.
223
     
 While the debate continues on what if any role UAVs are acceptable for in 
domestic law enforcement, in the absence of restrictive guidance several agencies are 
moving ahead with employing the technology.  In response to an inquiry from Senator 
Paul, the FBI acknowledged that it has already used UAVs in at least 10 
circumstances.
224
  The U.S. Border Patrol operates an independent fleet of 10 Predators 
outside of DoD control, and used this fleet to support missions by other agencies 
including the Coast Guard, the DEA, and local law enforcement a total of 687 times 
between 2010 and 2012.
225
 Finally, an April 2014 announcement from AG Holder 
confirmed that the ATF is pursuing the procurement of its own UAV fleet.
226
  Given 
these facts, it is unlikely that the UAV genie will be stuffed back into the bottle.  And, 
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